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In the decade of the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville 
published a perceptive analysis of America in the Jacksonian 
era, which focused upon the customs, manners and intellec-
tQal habits of its citizens, and their social condition as 
seen through its political institutions. He advanced the 
proposition--a paradox of democracy--that equality of condi-
tion was as compatible with tyranny as with freedom. The 
social consensus, which stemmed from the wide acceptance of 
doctrine of equality and common wants and interests, when 
brought to bear upon legislator and judge, public official, 
juryman, and the non-conforming individual, he termed the 
"tyranny of the majority." 
2 
This historical investigation of Tocqueville's majori-
tarian thesis concentrates upon those points of social ten-
sion which are most effectively displayed in one locus of 
their final resolution, the court system, where, he believed, 
the judiciary functioned as a powerful bulwark against the 
excesses of democracy. The judicial opinions of four state 
supreme courts, which have been selected for their geograph-
ical and political balance--Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Tennessee--are examined for the years 
1835-45, that followed immediately upon the publication of 
his treatise. Specifically, judicial restraint of the aspir-
ations of the assertive, self-confident and politically 
alert Americans who represented the majority in the legisla-
tures or through the jury system, or claimed, as individuals, 
certain vested rights, is reviewed. 
The results suggest that, in this period of opportun-
ism and dynamic change, the people's prerogative to inter-
pret the law through jury trial received chilly scrutiny; 
that the concern of the bench was for stable rules to regu-
late emergent forms of enterprise, and particular interests 
of individuals, for the good order and harmony of the nation, 
though their decisions might overturn the political judgment 
of the majority. By the end of the period, the judiciary 
had made a decisive stand regarding the nature and locality 
3 
of supreme authority, limiting majoritarian encroachments 
upon vested rights in politics, economics and property. The 
courts did not, however, safeguard minority rights that 
impinged upon majoritarian views which the judges shared. 
In the despotism of this accord--a paradox of Tocqueville's 
thesis--lies the tyranny of the majority. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Searching for the universal principles which govern 
egalitarian societies, so that he might resolve the politi-
cal conundrum of his time (whether society were more justly 
ruled by the few or by the many) , Alexis de Tocqueville vis-
ited America in the early 1830's. There he found an image 
of democracy which kindled his approbation, quickened his 
apprehension, and inspired a major interpretation of the 
American experience. In words as cogent as the biblical 
phrases echoed, he wrote: "The people reign in the American 
political world as the Deity does in the universe. They are 
the cause and the aim of all things; everything comes from 
them, and everything is absorbed in them." 1 Was 
Tocqueville's assessment an accurate depiction of Jacksonian 
America, or did it but reflect the prevalent hue of popular 
sentiment? 
To evaluate points of social tension, to discern what 
each generation thought of the relationship of the individ-
ual to the state, and the value placed on liberty--to test 
the validity of Tocqueville's thesis--judicial opinion 
1Alexis de Tocqueville, Democrac! in America, ed. 
Phillips Bradley (New York, 1966), I, 8. 
2 
provides rich insights. This discussion focuses on the 
supreme court records of four states: Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania and Tennessee, which provide geographical 
representation and a measure of political equilibrium. Both 
the Massachusetts and Tennessee courts had predominantly 
Whig leanings; in the other two states Democratic jurists 
we=e in the majority. The years 1835-45, which witnessed 
the dynamic advancement of the country in size and material 
well-being, in technology and business organization, demand 
particular scrutiny, as both political parties had the 
opportunity to respond to the age of egalitarianism in the 
determination of national policy. 2 Broadly, the evidence 
suggests that, though the function of politics was to secure 
to the majority the control and influence to which they were 
entitled in a democracy, the bench, allegedly an apolitical 
agency of government, defeated what it perceived to be popu-
lar errors, in the interests of political, social, and eco-
nomic doctrines to which the judiciary adhered. This is not 
to suggest a complete failure of justice, for the courts 
provided the vehicle for what Tocqueville would call "the 
slow and quiet action of society upon itself , 113 whereby 
minorities could secure the reconsideration of majority 
decisions. 
In this first decade following the publication of 
2Richard P. McCormick, "New Perspectives on Jacksonian 
Politics," American Historical Review, 65 (1960), 300. 
3Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 416. 
3 
Tocqueville's critique, the sturdy republic, its revolution-
ary heritage enshrined in its basic institutions, was "far 
out upon a democratic course. 114 As he had recorded, the 
nation had advanced steadily towards universal white manhood 
suffrage, the substitution of a tax qualification or service 
in the military, for property provisions, giving the impetus 
5 to practical democracy. Annual popular elections for the 
legislature and governor in most states compelled respect 
for the delegated trust. 6 Applying fundamental Jacksonian 
notions to the judiciary, the people, through their repre-
sentatives, regulated judicial salaries and dictated the 
duration of appointments; in 1846, New York's constitutional 
revisions initiated the popular election of judges. Indeed, 
legislative hegemony was repeatedly demonstrated by the 
exercise of other "judicial" powers: legislative divorces 
were ~ranted, marriages validated and dowers awarded, wills 
rejected by the courts were admitted to probate, mortgages 
were foreclosed, the administration of estates dictated, 
4Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion (Stanford, 
1957)' 4. 
5Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 351; Harold M. 
Hyman and William M. wiecek, E ual Justice under Law: 
Constitutional Development 1835-1875 (New York, 1982 , 8. 
6Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 83-5, 154. 
4 
and, until 1846, appellate jurisdiction was exercised by the 
New York senate. 7 
The democratization of investment opportunities was 
secured by regulations for accountability in corporate char-
ters, and the adoption of general incorporation acts after 
1830. 8 Disestablishment, which promoted religious liberty, 
was effected in Massachusetts by means of a constitutional 
amendment. 9 The legislatures responded, too, to reform 
movements, abolishing imprisonment for debt, modifying 
severe penalties reminiscent of eighteenth century justice, 
10 and improving the prison system, thus furnishing 
Tocqueville and his companion with an official reason, and 
the means, to visit the United States on behalf of the 
7Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 255: Bernard 
Schwartz, The Law in America: a History (New York, 1974), 
68; Carl B. Swisher, History of the Supreme Court in the 
United States, The Taney Period (Vol. V) (New York, 1974), 
206, 209: After the successful victory over the life judi-
ciary in Pennsylvania in 1839, and the reduction of state 
judicial salaries in Massachusetts in 1842, efforts were 
made to eliminate life tenure and lower the salaries of fed-
eral judges, including the Supreme Court, in 1842-3, though 
this would have required a constitutional amendment. 
Despite the expansion of responsibility due to the increas-
ing burden of circuit duties as the country grew, the new 
positions for associate justices notwithstanding, the sti-
pend of Supreme Court justices remained unchanged from 1819 
to 1855. 
8Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 
1945), 337. 
9Leonard w. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and 
Chief Justice Shaw (New York, 1957), 42. 
10Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice under Law, 47-50. 
11 French government. Observing the prolific exuberance of 
legislative activity, Tocqueville wrote: 
The authority exercised by the legislatures is supreme. 
Nothing prevents them from accomplishing their wishes 
with celerity and with irresistable power, and they are 
supplied with new representatives every year.12 
The election of Jackson to the presidency in 1828 and 
1832, which broke the "chain of decorous successions," 13 
confirmed the popularity principle. Tocqueville, whose 
sympathies were pro-Whig, wrote: 
5 
General Jackson, whom the Americans have twice elected 
to be the head of their government, is a man of violent 
temper and very moderate talents; nothing in his whole 
career ever proved him qualified to govern a free peo-
ple. 14 
Yet it was precisely Jackson's scorn of "privilege," or 
aristocratic pretensions, which drew forth the people's 
favour. By establishing as a practice the system of rota-
tion in office, Jackson extended democratic participation in 
government, demonstrating both his faith in the people as 
the "bone and sinew of the country," 15 and the fear that 
prolonged off ice-holding could become linked with economic 
11 James T. Schleifer, The Making of Tocqueville's 
Democracy in America (Chapel Hill, 1980), 3. Tocqueville's 
fellow-traveller was Gustave de Beaumont. 
12 
·11 . . 257 Tocquevi e, Democracy in America, I, • 
13 Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion, 12. 
14T ·11 . . 289 ocquevi e, Democracy in America, I, • 
15James o. Richardson, A Com,ilation of Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-189 (Washington, 1896), III, 
365. However, hardly insulated from party politics, the 
rotation doctrine was generally qualified by political tenet 
and personal loyalty. 
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power. Indeed, any disposition towards exclusiveness by 
elitist groups repugnant to the democratic man, such as the 
professions, was rendered ineffective by the redefinition of 
professional standards, by the legislatures, through the 
scaling down of educational requirements. This, and the 
leveling influence of the frontier, gave to Jacksonian soci-
ety the egalitarian cast which Tocqueville noted as his most 
"forcible" observation. 16 
Consistent with these circumstances was the renewal, 
under the Democratic party, of the movement for legal reform, 
a reinvocation of Jefferson's old agrarian vision of a soci-
ety based upon hard work, honest industry and moderate 
rewards. Antilegalism in the early nineteenth century was 
"more pervasive than either of the parties could control, 
th . d t . t . . . h . "1 7 some ing eep, a avis ic, persistent in t e community. 
It represented a belief in man's natural, reasonable and 
equitable instincts, his "beautiful and unerring sense of 
justice," and the conviction that law should be relatively 
simple and comprehensible. 18 It reflected the "strong 
strand" of middle class antipathy which had developed among 
merchants of the colonial period, because of legal hostility 
to their cheaper and speedier extra-judical arbitration 
16Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 3. 
17Perry Miller, The Life of· the Mind in America: from 
the Revolution to the Civil War (New York, 1965), 103. 
18 · 11 . . . Mi er, The Life of the Mind in America, 102. 
7 
19 
settlements, which had been self-regulated. It illus-
trated an antagonism, inherited from the colonial experience, 
to the use of customary or common law, because of its 
English origin, and the belief that the law as imported was 
·1 1 20 unnecessari y comp ex. The law, it was said, should be 
"of indigenous growth, 1121 "foreign and heathenish words" 22 
(Latin) should be dispensed with, so that an ignorant or 
inattentive lawyer would not misapply one of the various 
phrases by which suits at law were designated. Distrust of 
legal technicalities involved not only procedure, but fear 
of professional cunning and "legal chicanery," 23 which might 
manifest itself in the manipulation of society by clever 
lawyers and judges, and concern lest paid advocacy should 
blight man's moral impulse. 
Tocqueville, who was himself a lawyer, wrote: 
Nothing can be more obscure and strange to the uniniti-
ated than a legislation founded on precedents • • • 
19Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American 
Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, 1977), 146. 
20
"The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth 
Century," Yale Law Journal, 74 (1964), 180, n. 63. See also 
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American 
People (Princeton, 1970), 200-33: This anti-British enmity 
was exacerbated by periodic problems concerning the nation's 
northern borders, and involved the sensitive issue of slav-
ery. Besides affecting Southern sensibilities, the British 
attempts to crush the African slave trade intensified 
America's concern over a possible abuse of maritime rights. 
21 Mark De Wolfe Howe, ed., Readings in American Legal 
History (Cambridge, 1949), 472. 
22 Charles M. Haar, The Golden Age of American Law 
(New York, 1965), 230. 
23Miller, The Life of the Mind in America, 186. 
the American lawyer resembles the heirophants of Egypt, 
fo: like2~hem he is the sole interpreter of an occult science. 
For some American practioners of the law, not only 
8 
Democrats, though they were the more severe, such censure of 
the machinery of justice was warranted. They are best 
represented by Robert Rantoul of Massachusetts. Crusading 
for the simplification and codification of the laws, he con-
demned the common law as having its origin in "folly, bar-
barism and feudality," and charged that judge-made law, based 
on a "chain of precedents," was judicial legislation, ~ 
post facto law, indefinite and vague. The judiciary "not 
only usurps the confines of legislation, but runs riot 
beyond it," he said, "subversive of the fundamental princi-
ples of free government." The remedy was to remodel the 
great body of the law, merge the procedures of law and 
equity, and enact the result in the form of statutes, for 
"statutes speak the public voice." 25 Other lawyers sought 
to give to the reform of law a systemic basis and legisla-
tive sanction. In 1825, Edward Livingston completed four 
d f th f . . 26 h" h h d'f" . co es or e state o Louisiana, w 1c , w en co 1 1cat1on 
24Tocqueville, Demo·cracy in America, I, 277. Miller, 
in The Life of the Mind in America, 186, uses this quotation 
in the context of legal morality. As Tocqueville frater-
nised with Whig intellectuals, many of whom were lawyers, it 
seems that he intended rather to infer that ~~erican juris-
prudence as a system was chaotic, compared with the French, 
an achievement of the Napoleonic Codes. 
25Howe, Readings in American Legal History, 474-8. 
26 Haar, The Golden Age of American Law, 268-9; Swisher, 
The Taney Period, 34. 
9 
activity spread, were circulated throughout the country, 
finding greater acceptance in the new states of the west, 
though statutory revisions were enacted in Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania in the 1830's. 27 In New York, the first code 
of David Dudley Field, the state's leading codification advo-
cate, was approved in 1848. 28 
Pondering upon the overwhelming authority of the major-
ity in Arnerica, 29 Tocqueville decided that its basis lay in 
annual elections, in the right of electors in certain states 
to require th~t their representatives submit to mandates, in 
the legislative domination over the executive branch, and in 
the reach of the people into the sphere ~f judicial indepen-
dence through salary and tenure adjustments. 30 The moral 
authority of the majority lay in their collective intelli-
gence and wisdom, was enlarged by the wide acceptance of the 
doctrine of equality, 31 and a sense of community, or harmony 
of interests, which their history and traditions nourished. 
Several important results followed. Instability of the laws, 
27 Charles Warren, A History of· the American Bar (New 
York, 1939), 528. 
28
swisher, The Taney Period, 344. 
29T 0 ll . . . I 57 " h ocquevi e, Democracy in America, , : T e 
principle of the sovereignty of the people has acquired in 
the United States all the practical development that the 
imagination can conceive. • • • The people reign without 
impediment." 
30
rbid., I, 254-5, 154. 
31
rbid., I, 393: Not only its ideological foundation, 
but basic education (I, 316) and material prosperity (I, 
292-3) enhanced this sentiment of equality. 
and variations in their administration, mirrored the flue-
tuating membership of the dominant branch of the govern-
ment. 32 The politically viable figure, or the popular 
10 
writer, was he who conformed, and reinforced society in its 
assumptions of superiority. 33 
"Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous 
thing," wrote Tocqueville. Seeing the "irresistible 
strength" of the democratic institutions in America, he 
believed that he detected a "germ of tyranny," for to whom 
could an individual or a minority apply for guarantees 
against the abuse by the many of its authority? 
If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the 
majority; if to the legislature, it represents the 
majority and implicitly obeys it; if to the executive 
power, it is appointed by the majority and serves as a 
passive tool in its hands. The public force consists of 
the majority under arms, the jury is the majority 
invested with the right of hearing judicial cases, and in 
certain states even the judges are elected by the major-
ity. 34 
However, wrote Tocqueville, the potentially despotic 
pressure of public opinion was diminished by the absence of 
a centralized administration (because of federalism), by the 
32Ibid., I, 258, 262, 206: In discussing the fre-
quency of elections and the "perpetual mutability" of the 
law, Tocqueville at first suggested that an instinctive 
taste for variety, a "characteristic passion," had guided 
popular rule. Later, he exposed democracy's negative con-
cept of government: "The people in America obey the law not 
only because it is their own work, but because it may be 
changed if it is harmful; a law is observed because, first, 
it is a self-imposed evil, and, secondly, it is an evil of 
short duration." 
33Ibid., I, 265-6. 
34Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 261, 416. 
11 
division of the states' authority into counties and munici-
palities, and by the very vastness of the nation, so that 
natural sanctuaries of liberty could exist in "concealed 
breakwaters. 1135 Further, the tyranny of the majority was 
mitigated by the predominance of the legal profession. The 
prominence of this ubiquitious group was assured by educa-
tion, and by opportunities in both private law and public 
service, where social adjustments were made in legal terms, 
to infiltrate the whole community. Cautious, orderly, and 
conservative by training, they checked the passions and 
impetuosity inherent in popular government, assuming for 
themselves the role of preserving the fabric of society. 36 
Finally, though he had praised the jury as an "eminently 
republican element in the government, 1137 he proffered it as 
a co-agency, with the legal profession, in "moderating the 
movements of the people," for, by sanctioning the decision 
of the court in civil cases, jurors promoted the judge's 
responsible role, and transmitted into the community the 
principles whereby the law promoted the ends of justice. 38 
Did the judiciary function as a limit upon majoritar-
ian tyranny? Points of tension between the people's compe-
tence as jurors, to interpret the law, as legislators, to 
resolve social problems, and as individuals, to regulate 
their interests responsibly, and the judicial conception of 
35Ibid., I, 87-89, 271-2, 290. 
37Ibid. I I I 282. 
36Ibid., I, 270-80. 
38Ibid., I, 385-6. 
12 
harmonious social progress, are effectively displayed in the 
Supreme Court records of Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Tennessee. Highly representative cases, 
though not every conceivable case, in the decade following 
the publication of Democracy in America, are discussed in 
the ensuing pages, to test Tocqueville's thesis that majori-
tarian tyranny was implicit in the American conception of 
democracy. 
CHAPTER II 
The Judiciary and the Jury 
Tocqueville regarded the institution of the jury as 
an eminently republican institution, "as direct and as 
extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as 
universal suffrage." As potent as the suffrage privilege, 
because it applied and sanctioned the laws by punishing 
transgressors, it was "that portion of the nation to which 
the execution of the laws was entrusted," and was imbued 
with the "notion of right." Viewing Americans as strikingly 
litigious, he applauded the system as a "gratuitious public 
school, ever open" which prepared the people for exercising 
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and culti-
vated an acquaintance with the law. An essential element in 
criminal trials, it balanced the power of the judiciary and 
its potential to oppress with the competence of the people. 1 
Yet, he also saw the jury as a major check on majori-
tarian despotism. In civil cases, he argued, the judge, 
because of his commanding role, exercised an intellectual 
domination over the jury, who, in turn, while augmenting the 
1 To~queville, Democracy in America, I, 280-3. 
practical knowledge of the community, enhanced his moral 
authority by sanctioning his decision. 2 
The tension revealed in this dramatic shift in the 
14 
relationship of judge and jury in Tocqueville's assessment 
of criminal and civil trials is augmented by his perception 
of a "germ of tyranny" in the jury, which, as an agency of 
government, could perpetrate specific acts of oppression 
against minorities and dissenting individuals. 3 
What, then, was the status of trial by jury in 1835? 
By custom, the American colonists had settled the pro-
blems of pioneer populations on both civil and criminal mat-
ters through simple arbitration procedures, or lay referees 
performed limited regulatory roles while juries, judging 
transgressions by absolute moral standards, decided ques-
tions of both law and fact. 4 The public cherished the basic 
assumption that legal experts were unnecessary; that Every 
man might safely act as his own lawyer while society stood 
ready to protect his legal rights. The glowing promises of 
social justice, once British power was overthrown, were pro-
tected in the republican creed. Therefore, where the repub-
lic remained primarily an undeveloped agricultural area, the 
traditional conception that the jury had the right to decide 
questions of law was recognized and accepted, but generally 
only in criminal cases. For, as redress to the civil law 
2Ibid., I, 284-7. 3Ibid., I, 260. 
4Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 591. 
was beyond the reach of most people because of cost and 
delay, and cases were seldom notorious, judges had been 
able, unobtrusively, to narrow the province of the jury in 
civil actions, and, in some areas, to eliminate it. 
This was demonstrated in commercial litigation, par-
15 
ticularly in the port cities of Philadelphia, Boston and New 
York. 5 The use of extra-judicial means of settlement 
through arbitration, during the colonial period, had enabled 
merchants to avoid lengthy and extensive lawsuits before a 
professional bar not yet attuned to commercial interests. 6 
However, because of the growing number of appeals from arbi-
trat~on to the state courts, judges, by finding technical 
deficiencies, were able to subvert this system, and, by 1800 
marine insurance cases had become the mainstay of commercial 
lawyers. 7 The expedient identification of commercial law 
with natural law principles, or the "general law of nations," 
marked the beginning of a possible alliance between the mer-
cantile classes and the legal profession, 8 and the question 
of the control of juries took on a new significance. To 
resolve the dichotomy between the jury's equitable inquiry 
and certainty, an essential element of economic planning, 
judges employed two procedural devices: the "special case," 
5Horwitz, The T·ransformation of American Law, 141. 
6
rbid., 145-6. Arbitration committees were generally 
establiS'li'eCi by Chambers of Commerce. 
7Ibid., 141. One of Hamilton's first cases terminated 
in a damage judgment of $120,000. 
8Ibid., 144. 
16 
which reserved points of law for the bench, and the reversal 
of jury verdicts "contrary to the weight of evidence." 9 
As Alexander Hamilton had admitted in 1787, a gradual 
but significant erosion of the jury's role in civil cases 
had occurred. There was a "material diversity" in the 
extent of the institution in the state courts in these 
actions (in New York, courts of admiralty, probate and chan-
cery proceeded without the aid of a jury); he expressed 
"doubts as to [its] essentiality • • • to liberty" in civil 
cases, where questions were, he believed, "too complicated" 
for its effective use. However, he assured the people of 
New York that, though the Constitutional Convention had 
failed to protect jury trial in civil cases, it was seen as 
a "valuable safeguard to liberty • • • and a very palladium 
10 
of free government." 
During the first few decades of the nineteenth century, 
the courts of New York generally left questions of law to 
th d . . f . . . 11 . . 1 11 e ecisions o Juries in a crimina cases. Between 
1835 and 1845, in the only case which pertained to the 
9Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 142. 
The first in Pennsylvania occurred in 1788, and in New York 
in 1799, both to overturn jury verdicts against marine 
insurers. 
10The Federalist No. 83, ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New 
York, 1961), 499, 506, 509. Hamilton pointed to legislative 
authorization of the jury's decline in these fields. 
11 Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 580, n. 26. 
17 
jury's right to determine the law and the fact, 12 the 
supreme court predicted that a procedural change would 
demand a sharp distinction between law and fact, and a cor-
responding separation of function between judge and jury. 
People v. Rathbun (1839) concerned an indictment for forgery. 
In the trial court, the judge, before submitting the case to 
the jury for their decision on both the law and the fact, 
had reviewed the evidence, some of it circumstantial. The 
defendant's counsel objected to his summation, perceiving a 
distortion which did not favour his client, and presented a 
lengthy list of errors. Justice Esek Cowen, for the 
Democratic court, 13 explained the principle by which a rem-
edy by bill of exceptions, a recent refinement by statute, 
could be introduced. Criminal law allowed review by bill of 
exceptions of legal questions, he said, and conclusions from 
fact by the judge were to be taken as merely advisory to the 
jury, who were the "tribunal to correct the error$, in point 
12F. N. Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State 
Constitutions, Colonial Charters and other Organic Laws of 
the States, Territories and Colonies now and heretofore 
forming in the United States of America (Washington, 1909), 
1648. 
13
rn this period the court consisted of John Savage, 
Chief Justice - Democrat (C clopaedia of American Biograph , 
Appleton and Company, 1888, V, ; Samue Ne son, C ie 
Justice - Democrat (Dictionary of American Biography, VII, 
422); Green c. Bronson, Chief Justice (1845) - Democrat 
(Appleton's, I, 384)1 Freeborn G. Jewett and Esek Cowen, 
both of whom remain elusive, though the latter's brother was 
a leader of the Whigs in upper New York in the 1840's and 
was also a lawyer (National Cyclotaedi·a of American 
Biography, XII, 58). The Chancel or was Reuben H. Walworth 
- Democrat (Dictionary of American Biography, x, 406). 
18 
of fact, both of the judge and counsel." 14 Deeming the 
errors to be factual, "frivolous ••• or irrelevant," 15 he 
added that, though it appeared to the defendant's counsel 
that the trial judge's charge to the jury was more than an 
advisory declaration on the facts, the judge had concluded 
by resigning the case to the jury upon every point of law 
and fact. This was "more favorable for the prisoner than 
b k . d .. 16 . . s . t 17 h •t some oo s require • Citin9 u •• v. Battis e. w ere i 
was held that the instructions of the court upon the matter 
of law were conclusive upon the jury, he declared that this 
decision now had "additional force under a system of crimi-
nal law which allows a review by a bill of exceptions of the 
legal questions. 1118 
Pennsylvania's constitutional provision gave the jury 
the right to determine the law and the fact under the direc-
tion of the court, in indictments for libel and other 
cases. 19 The meaning of libel in the jury clause is associ-
ated with the highly partisan dispute over the passage of 
the federal Sedition Act of 1798, which supposed that the 
government could be criminally assaulted by the expression 
of critical views. Pushed through by the extreme wing of 
the Federal party, this statute, they claimed, liberalized 
the traditional law of seditious libel by permitting truth 
1421 Wendell, 548. 15Ibid. I 547. 
16Ibid., 526. 172 Sumner, 240 (1835). 
1821 Wendell, 526-7. 
19Thorpe, ed.,· Federa·1 ·and State· Constitutions, 3122. 
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as a defense, and by allowing the jury to decide whether an 
utterance were libelous. For the traditional or common law, 
which had been incorporated in the First Amendment, merely 
prohibited censorship prior to publication, permitting sub-
sequent discipline for licentious or seditious abuse, truth 
providing no protection, and the judge having sole power to 
determine the crucial question of whether the defendant's 
remarks were libelous, or of a bad tendency. The belea-
guered Republicans, attacking the act as unconstitutional, 
asserted that the First Amendment had outlawed seditious 
libel. Therefore, the jury had the power to determine the 
ultimate legal question of the substantive meaning of a sta-
tute, but was bound to follow the court's opinion in matters 
concerning evidence and constitutionality. 20 This seems to 
have been the accepted practice in Pennsylvania from its 
early years. 21 
Judicial dicta during the first half of the nineteenth 
century suggest, however, that judges were bringing a new 
policy orientation towards the jury's role. Kalb's Case 
(1835) had reference to an act of 1815, which provided for 
the holding of a special court in divorce cases. Counsel 
had implied that the act required courts only where a jury 
was necessary to determine a suit. Justice John Kennedy, 
20
aowe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 587. 
21 Ibid., 595. 
20 
for the Democratic court, 22 ruled that: 
As the province of the jury is only to decide on the 
facts and not the law of the case, it is obvious that in 
every case where the parties agree as to the facts of 
it, a jury is unnecessary, and that the action must be 
tried and decided by the court alone.23 
Again, in Sypher v. Long (1835), an action for debt on a 
note under seal, Chief Justice John Gibson, asserting that 
it was an error to charge a jury to find a fact without evi-
dence, added: "In what is called, in other respects, a 
'hard case,' juries are often sufficiently prompt to break 
through the law, without the suggestion of a pretext for 
't .. 24 i • 
In Brown v. Brown (1837), the trial court had submit-
ted as a matter of fact to the jury the division of property 
by a will. Justice Kennedy objected to the ruling by the 
jury, hinting that justice characteristic of jury determina-
tions was rough, informal, and arbitrary. Where the jury 
had established a crooked line, he said, a straight line was 
obviously indicated, and would prevent subsequent strife and 
litigation. He believed it to be the duty of the court to 
interpret instruments of writing where precision and cer-
tainty were required. He feared that a jury would be 
22Pennsylvania's court consisted of John B. Gibson, 
Chief Justice (Dictionary of National Biography, IV, 254); 
Molton C. Rogers and Charles Huston, who, like Gibson, were 
appointed by Governor Shulze, Democrat, in the 1820's 
(National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XIV, 39, 145); 
John Kennedy, who was appointed by Shulze in 1830 (Who was 
Who in America, 1607-1898, 48), and Thomas Sergeant, 
Democrat (Dictionary of American Biography, VIII, ii, 590). 
23 24 . Watts, 156. Ibid., 254. 
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tempted to make "the most accommodating partition of the 
land between the parties • • • according to their notions of 
what might have been the intention of the testator," or 
might "equalize the bounty • • • believing that it would 
have been just as equitable in him to have done so." 2S 
In 1837, the court intimated that the law was becoming 
so complex that interpretations, even of facts, were becom-
ing a matter for professionals. In Yater v. Sanna, Chief 
Justice Gibson found that though it was usually the business 
of the jury to deal with presumptions of mere fact, because 
they were now of growing importance in the evaluation of 
evidence, they were "conclusions from experience, 1126 upon 
which the court ought to adjudicate. He reversed the jury's 
finding that a "lost" paid prize ticket for a lottery, now 
lapsed, was not sufficiently accounted for; payment must be 
assumed. 
The provisions in the 1834 Constitution of Tennessee 
concerning the jury gave them "in all indictments for libels 
••• a right to determine the law and the facts, under the 
direction of the court, as in other criminal cases." 27 This 
was a verbatim repetition of the clause in Pennsylvania's 
Declaration of Rights, with the addition of the word "crimi-
nal," and the insertion suggested that its source could lie 
2S6 Watts, SS. 26 6 Watts, 16S. 
27Thorpe, ed., Federal and State Constitutions, 3428. 
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in Fox's Libel Act. 28 If this Libel Act were applicable in 
the Tennessee constitutional provision, the words "under the 
directon of the court" referred to the court's instructions 
upon the legal question of the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. The following cases concerning the jury's role in 
Tennessee reflect the confusions concerning the source of 
the provision, and ambiguities inherent in its interpreta-
t . 29 ion. 
McGowan v. State (1836) was a case against gaming. 
The defendant's counsel charged that, among other errors, 
the trial judge had erred in claiming that the court was the 
judge of the law, and that the jury must receive the law as 
expounded by the court. He believed it to be an accepted 
practice in the state that the jury, "sworn to make a true 
deliverance between the state and the accused," had the 
power to render a general verdict of not guilty, and, as no 
tribunal could contest the decision, the legal power admit-
ted the legal right. 30 Wise juries would exercise this 
28Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 585. Under 
the common law, the jury had passed only upon the fact of 
publication, while the judge decided the question of whether 
the defendant's remarks were libelous. Fox's Libel Act was 
a reforming English statute of 1792 which gave to the jury 
the right to pronounce the verdict "under the directions of 
the court." It had, however, received two conflicting inter-
pretations: that, in prosecutions for libel, as in all crim-
inal cases, the jury might find a verdict upon the whole 
matter of the defendant's guilt or innocence, or, that it 
was the jury's duty to follow the instructions of the court 
upon all questions of law. 
29Ibid., 588, 598-600. 
30 9 Yerger, 191. 
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power circumspectly, and, to counter the oppression of cor-
rupt judges, must find against a court which they believed 
to be wrong. Such power was given by the Constitution. If 
the jury did not have the right to judge the law, counsel 
could not argue the law before them, and the accused would 
be denied the right of full defense. 
Justice William Reese31 sustained the trial court's 
instruction that the "court was to be the judge of the law, 
and the jury exclusively the judges of matters of fact, and 
it was the duty of the jury to receive the law as laid down 
and expounded by the court," but he described these words as 
"perhaps inaccurate, and may be, too strong." 32 The jury 
were not the exclusive judges of the facts, he said, for the 
court could set aside a guilty verdict if, on appraisal, it 
appeared that the conclusion belied the weight of evidence. 
Quoting Justice Samuel Putnam, in Commonwealth v. Knapp, 33 
however, he gave the jury discretionary power to be guided 
by the court in matters of law, but, "when the jury under-
take to decide the law, in opposition to the advice of the 
court, they assume a high responsibility, and should be very 
31 In early 1835, the state's Superior Court consisted 
of John Catron, Chief Justice, Jacob Peck and Nathan Green, 
all chosen by the Jacksonian legislature in the 1820's 
(Swisher, The Taney Period, 60). In December, 1835, the 
Supreme Court was established by statute, and Green was 
joined by William B. Turley and William B. Reese, all 
appointed by Governor Cannon, who was a Whig (Stanley F. 
Flomsbee, Robert E. Corlew, Enoch L. Mitchell, Tennessee, a 
Short History (Knoxville, 1969), 192. 
32 9 Yerger, 194-5. 
33 10 Pickering, 495 (1830). 
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1 1 h h . ht "34 careful to see c ear y t at t ey are rig • With this 
admonition, he affirmed the decree. 
The following year, Justice Nathan Green, in Dale v. 
State, sustaining a judgment of murder against Dale in the 
circuit court, re-affirmed, after "mature consideration," 
the opinion of the court in McGowan, which he regarded as 
"substantially correct." 3S He denied the bill of exceptions 
artfully presented by the defendant's counsel, who had drawn 
from the trial judge a view, while the jury was in seclusion, 
which differed from the statement of the court in McGowan. 
The court was obviously disapproving, but not yet pre-
pared to deny the jury's right conclusively. By 1842, how-
ever, the court, through Justice Reese, claimed that it was 
"too obviously correct to be drawn into question or argu-
ment," 36 that the jury were not the judges of the law, and 
that the insistence of the defendant's counsel that the jury 
were at liberty to disregard the law as given to them by the 
court was a proposition "of dangerous tendency • • • and not 
permitted by the laws of the state. 1137 The court had come 
to the conclusion, it seems, that only clear ·instructions to 
juries, necessary to prevent "novel" interpretations of the 
law, would "secure the repose of society. 1138 
The right of the jury to determine the law in the col-
any of Massachusetts had been recognized in criminal cases, 
34 9 Yerger, 195 (1836). 3s10 Yerger, SSS. 
363 Humphreys 277, Mccorry v. King's Heirs. 
37Ibid., 270. 38Ibid., 276. 
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39 though it remained inconclusive in civil cases. In 1808, 
however, the legislature affirmed the jury's common law 
right to decide, at their discretion, both the law and the 
f b 1 d . t 40 act, y a genera ver ic • This statute, which was never 
interpreted by the courts, see~s clearly to have been 
reflected in Commonwealth v. Knapp41 and Commonwealth v. 
Kneeland. In the latter case, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, 
for the predominantly Whig court, 42 stated that, in criminal 
cases, "by the form in which the issue is made up, the jury 
43 pass upon the whole matter of law and fact." 
In 1839, the court appears to have moved towards a 
more authoritative role. In that year, Democratic Justice 
Marcus Morton rejected the plea of defendant's counsel that 
the issue of probable cause was a mixed question, involving 
both law and fact, which ought to be submitted to the jury. 
In Stone v. Crocker, he stated that, to have taken the opin-
ion of the jury as to whether certain facts and circum-
stances amounted to probable cause, would have been to 
obtain their judgment on a pure question of law. This would 
have confounded the functions of judge and jury, which 
should be kept as distinct as possible. 44 
3SThe Changing Role of the Jury," 174, n. 27. 
40Ibid., 174. 41 10 Pickering 495 (1830). 
42The Massachusetts court during this period consisted 
of Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice, Samuel Putnum, Samuel Wilde, 
Charles Dewy, Samuel Hubbard, and Richard Fletcher, all 
Whigs, and Marcus Morton, Democrat (Levy, The Law of the 
Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw, 337-8). 
43 20 p· k . 222 (1838) 44 4 . . ic ering • 2 Pickering 84. 
26 
In 1845, in an action involving the liquor license 
laws, Justice Charles Dewey upheld the trial judge's finding 
that it was the province of the court to rule upon the mean-
ing of statutes, and the duty of the jury to follow the rul-
ing of the court on a question of law, which, in the case at 
hand, involved a judgment as to whether the addition of 
water and sugar added to gin made it less "spiritous." The 
jury, however, had the power to return such verdict as they 
saw fit, even against the instructions of the court. 45 
This decision was further amplified in Commonwealth v. 
Porter (1845) where the defendant was charged with having 
violated a statute forbidding innkeepers from selling intox-
icating liquors. The trial judge had instructed the jury 
that, though they possessed the power of rendering a general 
verdict in opposition to the court's ruling, and would be 
free of attaint, 46 they would be over-ruled and reversed. 
Porter's counsel contended that power and right were "con-
vertible terms; 1147 that if the law gave the jury power to 
determine the law and the fact in a general verdict, it gave 
them the right also. By withholding power from the court to 
alter a verdict of not guilty in criminal cases, the law 
assumed the jury's right to exercise this power indepen-
dently of the judge; if a jury convicted against the opinion 
45 10 Metcalf 14, Commonwealth v. White. 
46The conviction of a jury for giving a false verdict, 
now an obsolete procedure. 
47 10 Metcalf, 169. 
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of the court, the remedy lay with the court to set the ver-
dict aside. Surely, he said, the jury resolved both law and 
fact when they deliberated on a general verdict, for why 
distinguish it from a special verdict if they did not? 
Indeed, if a jury could not determine the law according to 
their judgment and conviction, their verdict was forced upon 
them, their oaths were meaningless, and the citizen was 
deprived of his right to be judged by his peers. To suggest 
that the jury would not comprehend the law was to "disparage 
their office as well as to impugn the law, which does not 
assume incapacity where it imposes duties to be performed.1148 
He saw the jury as a safer deposit of popular rights in a 
free government than a court, which was not responsible for 
its judgments, though they be wrong or corrupt. Until the 
excitement caused by the liquor license cases, both the com-
mon law and precedent had sustained the right of juries to 
decide the law, and such had been the instruction in 
Commonwealth v. Knapp and Commonwealth v. Kneeland. Nor had 
the practice of counsel to argue the law to the jury for 
their deliberation ever before been denied or questioned in 
the judicial history of the state. 
Justice Shaw, setting aside the verdict, left with 
counsel the right to address the jury on questions of law, 
citing the "latitude which has been allowed in this 
Commonwealth, by a long course of practice." 49 He accepted 
that observations by counsel must contain an exposition of 
48 10 Metcalf 274. 49Ibid., 285. 
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.,,,,,-
the law, to the possible edification of all, but he saw as 
"separate and distinct," 50 the question of whether the jury 
might then decide authoritatively upon the law. Vigorously 
d . h' . ht 51 h t t d th t . th d t' f enying t is rig , e s a e a , since e a op ion o 
jury trial as a settled mode of proceeding in courts of jus-
tice, it had been recognized that it was the province and 
duty of judges to decide the law, and of juries to consider 
and weigh facts. Upon this was founded the whole doctrine 
of bills of exception, which gave to all persons the full 
benefit of revision by the court of last resort on all ques-
tions of law. According to the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth, every citizen was entitled to the authorita-
tive declaration and application of the laws, fixed and per-
manent, impartial and equal in operation. Hinting that a 
jury, having a rightful authority to decide questions of law, 
might legitimize local prejudices, he asked how the security 
of citizens could be protected without a steady and uniform 
interpretation of the laws. And it was the "more necessary 
to adhere to this rule," he said, because it was "within the 
province • • • of the judicial department, on proper occa-
sions, to decide whether an act ••• is within the just 
limits of legislative power, and whether it is constitu-
tional and valid." 52 
50 10 Metcalf 275. 
51 In 1855, Dewey would suggest that these two rulings 
were "not in entire harmony." (Commonwea·lth v. Anthes 
5 Gray 238.) 
5210 Metcalf 281. 
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Commonwealth v. Abbott, in 1847, decided the question 
of whether the jury was bound to follow the court's opinion 
on constitutionality. Shaw sustained the trial court's rul-
ing that a juror could not be disqualified because he had 
formed and expressed an opinion on the constitutional valid-
ity of the liquor license laws, but he denied the juror's 
right to determine constitutionality, insisting that it was 
his duty to be governed by the instructions of the court, 
even though his opinion might differ. In this way he frus-
trated counsel's design to obtain an acquittal on a statute 
nullified by a jury. 53 
The political response stimulated by these cases 
resulted in an amendment in the state constitutional conven-
tion of 1853, giving juries the right to interpret the law. 
When this amendment, together with the new constitution, was 
rejected by the voters, the legislature passed a statute in 
1855 which provided that "in all trials for criminal 
offences, it shall be the duty of the jury ••• to decide 
at their discretion • both the fact and law involved in 
th . ,,54 e issue. 
Shaw reinterpreted this statute in Commonwealth v. 
Anthes (1855). Asserting that it was a "declaratory act, 
making no substantial change in the law regulating the 
53 13 Metcalf 120. 
54 Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185. 
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relative rights and functions of the court and the jury," 55 
he held that the trial judge had erred in permitting the 
jury to determine the meaning of the liquor license law. 
Several cases in the state bearing upon this statute justi-
fied a fresh analysis of procedure in criminal prosecutions, 
and Shaw proceeded to give a lengthy and definitive opinion 
on the respective provinces of judge and jury. 
The Constitution and the common law entrust to the 
judge, he said, the determination of the law on which an 
indictment is founded. This required proficiency and skill 
in jurisprudence, and an accurate and complete knowledge of 
constitutional law. Adjudication of facts, which demanded a 
practical knowledge of affairs, discernment of motives, 
integrity and impartiality, was invested in the jury, with 
the power to embrace and declare the law, as received from 
the court, and the fact, in finding a general verdict. Cer-
tainty and uniformity in the administration and exercise of 
judicial power, which preserved the defendant's right to 
due process, presupposed that the jury received the law from 
the court, and acted in conformity with it. Where, in ear-
lier times, the doctrine of attaint was the only way to 
reverse a judgment, exceptions could now be made to the rul-
ing of a judge. If a statute allowed the jury to interpret 
the law, no exceptions would lie, for the law incorporated 
55Ibid., 187. 
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in the verdict would be unknowable. 56 The exercise of judi-
cial review by a jury, or the variable and inconclusive 
application of the law, would subvert the Constitution of 
the Commonwealth, which provided for a state court of last 
resort, under independent and unbiased judges, with power of 
review, and the authority to guide by precedents to assure 
uniformity in all courts. 
Taking a narrow view of the statute, he stated that, 
if a jury were to try criminal cases "according to estab-
lished forms and principles of law, 1157 they would be proceed-
ing upon the familiar ground of the common law, in receiving 
the law from the court. He agreed that ambiguity in the 
words "try" and "decide by a general verdict1158 might lead 
to the supposition that a jury could determine the law, and 
assess the constitutional validity of a statute, against the 
directions of the court. However, even the "broadest and 
most liberal view1159 of the Constitution, would find the 
statute unconstitutional, for the Legislature could not vest 
in other persons, whose duties were limited and temporary, 
the power of the judicial department to decide the law. 
In separate opinions, Justices George T. Bigelow, 
Charles Dewey and Benjamin F. Thomas, all Whigs, the latter 
56But see "The Changing Role of the Jury," 174, 181 
n. 66: The problem of the jury's determination of the law 
could have been met by interrogating the jury, or by utiliz-
ing a reviewing court. These suggestions were made in 1847 
and 1809. 
575 Gray 220. 
59Ibid., 222. 
two dissenting, insisted that it was the legislature's 
intent to change the rule of the common law as declared in 
Porter because of adverse criticism of the opinion in the 
community. Bigelow believed that a "true construction" of 
the statute must acknowledge the intent of the legislature 
to change the rule in Porter, but believed that it was not 
within the constitutional authority of the legislature to 
f h . h . . 60 con er sue a rig t on Juries. Neither Dewey nor Thomas 
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regarded the statute as giving more than a carefully guarded 
and qualified power and right to the jury to depart from the 
instructions of the court in favour of the accused. Any 
intelligent and watchful judge would, they believed, know 
whether the jury had conformed to the court's opinion, and 
the party would be protected by bills of exception. But 
they had reservations about the statute. Though asserting 
that judges should have no opinion concerning its wisdom and 
expediency, Thomas ventured: 
Whether the statute is in harmony with public policy, 
whether it renders less certain the conviction of 
offenders against the law, whether it gives to jurors a 
power for the exercise of which their previous training 
has not fitted them, are questions for the lawrnaker.61 
However, neither would deny the statute's constitu-
tionality. Reviewing the changes in the system of jury 
trial, they recognized the contributions of legislation. Had 
not the legislature, said Thomas, used its power to ensure 
that juries were impartial and independent, and persons of 
character and intelligence? Indeed, had not the legislature 
60 5 Gray, 251. 61 5 Gray, 283. 
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declared the right of the jury to decide, at their discre-
tion, both the law and the fact, in a law of 1807, in force 
until 1836, never tested by the courts, and only left out in 
the revised statutes, he believed, because it was a familiar 
rule requiring no affirmative legislation? Did not 
Commonwealth v. Kneeland concur with the statute; had not 
Justices Wilde and Morton accepted that cases arise where 
the jury might assess the constitutionality of a legislative 
act? Yet Porter had rejected practice and usage, treating 
the matter as "one of abstract reason and speculation." 62 
The Supreme Court, he said, "on the verge of political dis-
cussion ••• was on extremely dangerous ground." 63 
The meaningful role which laymen had played in court 
proceedings was considerably restrained by the middle of the 
nineteenth century. As these cases demonstrate, the judi-
cial arbitrators of orderly social process, no matter whe-
ther Democrat or Whig, determined that the people as jurors 
should no longer, as previously agreed upon, interpret ques-
tions of law, had contracted the role of the jury to the 
resolution of questions of fact. Having established control 
in civil cases, where, as Tocqueville had seen, a judge/jury 
partnership functioned as a major check on majoritarian 
despotism, the courts had extended their domination into 
criminal cases, molding a protective framework to preserve 
minorities from the people at large. Echoing Tocqueville's 
anxiety that juries might succumb to the subtle pressures 
62s Gray, 283. 63Ibid., 260. 
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and intimidations of majorities, which, generating a "germ 
of tyranny," contributed to the unpredictability and uncer-
tainty of the legal system, the courts fixed boundaries upon 
the people's power as jurors to sanction the wrathful will 
of the majority. 
CHAPTER III 
The Judiciary and the Political Authorities 
In describing the operation of judicial review, 
Tocqueville wrote that a law, once censured in the courts, 
was not abolished, though it lost "a portion of its moral 
force"; it required "reiterated attacks of judicial func-
tionaries" to accomplish its final destruction. He believed 
that legislation was protected from "wanton" assaults by the 
judiciary, for, when a judge contested a law "in an obscure 
debate on some particular case," the importance of his 
attack was generally concealed from the public's attention. 
Further, such assault necessarily required that the private 
interests of an individual must be linked with the dubious 
law in the course of litigation; judicial censorship over 
legislation therefore could never extend to all laws indis-
criminately. 1 
Yet, Tocqueville would later write that, "armed with 
the power of declaring the laws unconstitutional, the 
American magistrate perpetually interferes in political 
affairs" through the courts of justice, "by which the legal 
profession is enabled to control the democracy." 2 This 
1Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 101-3. 
2Ibid., I, 178-9. 
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contradiction meriting close consideration, the question is, 
did legislative, or judicial, standards of constitutional 
propriety prevail? 
In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton had claimed that 
the,judiciary was designed as an "intermediate body" between 
the legislature, whose authority, as servant of the people, 
was limited by the Constitution, and the people, in whom 
sovereignty lay. Where the decisions of the legislature, 
proclaimed in its statutes, violated the will of the people, 
as declared in the Constitution, it became the duty of the 
courts to declare such actions void, for the interpretation 
of the law was the peculiar province of jurists. This sup-
posed no superiority of the judicial over the legislative 
power, for both were agents of the people. Instead, it 
advanced a "more rational interpretation" of the 
Constitution, which had no clear provisions regarding the 
resolution of constitutional conflicts. 3 
An alternative to Hamilton's view that the judiciary 
was the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality, echoed in 
Tocqueville's declaration that the courts, far from imposing 
their construction of the Constitution on others, merely 
applied their evaluation to cases before them, was claimed 
by Jackson in his bank veto of July, 1832. 4 His conception 
of presidential authority, with its contention that the 
3
clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Paper~, 467. 
4Richardson, Messa·ges a·nd Papers of the Presidents, 
II, p. 582. 
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executive was not obliged to recognize the validity of judi-
cial decisions, proceeded from his right to exercise a sepa-
rate judgment upon the widom and constitutionality of a pro-
posed law, and could not be seriously challenged. However, 
linked as it was with the bank recharter issue, it raised 
storms of controversy. 
Early nineteenth century courts had tended to leave to 
the electoral and legislative processes the resolution of 
conflicts between organized social interest groups, and few 
had reviewed constitutional matters of more than individual 
or local interest. Their perceived purpose, which Hamilton 
had articulated, was to protect the people, a cohesive body 
possessing shared beliefs about the nature of republican 
government, from legislatures which betrayed their trust and 
violated the Constitution. 5 
With the advent of Jacksonian democracy, an enlarged 
electorate presupposing a more responsible selection, the 
prospect of legislative betrayal in an increasingly democra-
tic society seemed more remote. Further, judges acknow-
ledged that constitutional provisions were often inexact. 
This necessary condition of a flexible system of government 
that could adjust to the changing needs of society meant, 
however, that the exercise of judicial discretion in the 
invalidation of legislative acts, which involved a value 
5
william E. Nelson, "Changing Conceptions of Judicial 
Review," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 120 (1972), 
1177. 
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judgment as political as it was legal, could be perceived as 
anti-democratic. Yet, courts could no longer ignore the 
re-evaluation of legislative political determinations upon 
divisive social conflicts between organized groups, as these 
cases came increasingly before them. 
In this new context, where courts were more aware of 
the public interest in, and significance of, their decisions, 
respect for the legislature, according to Leonard Levy, was 
a "maxim" of the Shaw court in Massachusetts. 6 Only two 
cases of judicial intervention within the province of the 
political authorities occurred in the ten-year period, 
1835-45, and these both concerned local government. 
In the first case, City of Boston v. Shaw (1840), 
Justice Putnam found invalid a by-law of the City of Boston. 
The ordinance had required that every landowner who used a 
city sewer should be assessed for its construction, accord-
ing to the immediate prior evaluation made of his property. 
Though the power was given by charter to the city to lay and 
assess taxes and make by-laws, and it was reasonable for the 
city to construct common sewers, when he considered the mode 
of assessment he believed it to be unequal and unreasonable, 
and therefore unjust. For the apportionment to be fair, he 
suggested, it ought to be made on the value of the land 
6Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice 
Shaw, 267. 
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independently of the buildings, and should be settled at the 
time of construction. 7 
In Worcester v. Western Railroad Corporation (1842), 
Chief Justice Shaw, using the eminent domain power as an 
instrument to encourage economic growth, extended a tax 
immunity for a so-called public work. The city had claimed 
that, although the railroad's right of way was exempt from 
taxes, its buildings, lying in whole or in part within the 
limits of the right of way, were not. After examining the 
railroad's charter, Shaw ruled that the corporation, estab-
lished "for the public use and benefit," held its personal 
property "in trust for the public • for a well-defined 
public object," and that, because the legislature had 
reserved to itself certain powers and controls, it was not a 
private corporation in the contemplation of the law, and, as 
such, like bridges and turnpikes, was exempt from taxes. 8 
No limit to this exemption was written into the charter, 
therefore all buildings "used to promote the purposes con-
templated by the act," and all lands purchased by the cor-
poration were immune "as appropriated to public use," unless 
they were reasonably incident to the support of the railroad, 
or to its use as a common carrier. 9 
Perhaps at issue, also, was concern that localism 
could result in inconsistent bases of evaluation and/or com-
petition for revenue among taxing towns, which could 
71 Metcalf, 130. 
9Ibid., 568. 
8 4 Metcalf, 566. 
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seriously impede the development of facilities critical to 
the general economy. These two cases reveal that the 
Massachusetts court had decided to foster economic changes 
on their terms; that, within the boundaries of constitu-
tional safeguards, the law would protect and aid individuals 
. th . . t 1 . 10 in eir priva e p anning. What appears significant in 
the later case is the community consensus, a belief shared 
by both legislature and judiciary, that legal doctrines 
should delegate power and resources to private entrepreneurs 
to promote economic growth, a view of public policy that was 
highly pragmatic. 
The predominant characteristic of judicial review in 
Pennsylvania in this period, on the other hand, is a marked 
antagonism towards the legislature, which had asserted its 
dominance by interfering with judicial tenure. The subject 
was particularly sensitive. Just before the new 
Constitution of 1838 went into effect, the Chief Justice was 
persuaded by his friends to resign, and was re-appointed by 
the outgoing governor, securing the longest term that the 
new law allowed. 11 
Leib v. Commonwealth (May, 1840) concerned an asso-
ciate judge of the Court of Common Pleas who had duplicated 
10James W. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in 
Nineteenth Century United States (Madison, 1956), 52, 25: 
"A kind of insistence on equal protection of the law, that a 
particular individual should not be made to bear out of his 
own resources the cost of conununity benefit." 
11 Howard Knott, Dictionary o·f American· Biography, IV, 
254. 
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this procedure. At issue was the attempt by the legislature 
to initiate popular control of the bench by substituting a 
limited commission for life tenure. The lower court had 
determined that, according to the amended constitution of 
the state, Leib had no authority to exercise the office of 
associate judge after January 1, 1839. The decision of the 
court was delivered by Justice Sergeant, a Democrat who 
would strongly oppose the amendment to elect judges and 
resign in 1843. 12 He denied that the court below had juris-
diction under an act of June, 1836, whereby power was given 
to the courts of common pleas to hear personal suits "within 
their respective counties." 13 Holding that an associate 
judge of the Court of Common Pleas was not a county officer 
within the meaning of the act, which embraced instead "offi-
cers inferior in grade and consequence," but was, as 
described in the amended constitution of 1838, an "associate 
judge of the state," he regretted the finding that Leib no 
longer held his commission in January 1, 1839. 14 The amend-
ment concerning associate justices, differing from that 
12Julian P. Boyd, Ibid., VIII, ii, 590. 
139 Watts, 220 (1840). This court was Leib's own. 
His appointment by the out-going governor on December 29, 
1838, followed upon a vacancy created- when Daniel Yost 
resigned, after holding the commission for 30 years. Judge 
Porter, the president of the court, observed that, "although 
it is not contended that the respondent had anything to do 
with procuring his resignation, yet still, for that resigna-
tion there would have been no vacancy to fill." (Ibid., 
215)'. --
149 Watts, 215. 
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affecting president judges, 15 made no express qualifications 
regarding the time at which commissions had been issued. 
Nor had the legislature the power to arrange by statute, and 
then re-arrange by another, the classification of associate 
justices as to tenure, for this was "inconsistent with the 
constitution, and fraught with inconvenience and hazard to 
the community." 16 Therefore, he considered as valid the act 
of June, 1839, which had systematized the tenure of associ-
ate justices according to the priority of the dates of their 
commissions as they stood on January, 1839, and under which 
Leib was designated to remain in office until February, 
1843. 17 The supplementary act of March, 1840, which graded 
commissions according to the date of the adoption of the 
constitution, which the legislature chose to recognize as 
October 9, 1838, and which terminated Leib's term in 
February, 1840, now past, Sergeant considered to be uncon-
stitutional. Further, the earlier statute was passed during 
the legislature's first session according to a provision 
15The precedent for the finding in the lower court was 
Commonwealth v. Collins, 8 Watts 331, (1839), where Justice 
Kennedy had held that the new constitution had been adopted 
when the speaker of the senate publicly announced its rati-
fication, which had occurred on December 11, 1838. (Justice 
Huston, in a strong dissent, had determined the date of 
adoption to be January 1, 1839.) President judges appointed 
between the adoption of the constitution and January 1, 1839, 
therefore lost their commissions on the latter date. 
16
watts, 227. 
17
rbid., thereby ranking Leib according to the senior-
ity of the commission as held by his predecessor, Yost. 
Actually, Leib took the oath of office on December 31, 1838. 
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required by the new constitution, which a subsequent legis-
lature could not constitutionally do. 18 
In Norman v. Heist (1843), Chief Justice Gibson con-
strued an act so as to set limits to legislative omnipotence, 
but stopped short of voiding it. In this case, by an act 
passed in 1841, the children of an illegitimate son were 
declared to be "able and capable" of inheriting their grand-
19 mother's property. As she had died in 1840 without making 
a will, her estate had passed to her brothers by the intes-
tate laws, though her grandchildren had continued to reside 
there. Stating that the latter had misconstrued the effect 
of the statute, which was merely enabling, and that the pro-
perty might yet descend to them in default of issue of the 
brothers, Gibson denounced the act as "an ~ post facto 
rescript or decree made for the occasion." 
Retracting his former statements regarding judicial 
review, 20 the Chief Justice declared that, as the estate was 
18 9 Watts, 226-7, for it is "a delegation to that spe-
cific body of a portion of the sovereign power of the people." 
195 Watts and Sergeant, 173 (1843). 
20As a judge in Pennsylvania in 1825, Gibson had con-
tested the exercise of judicial review upon legislative acts, 
which he perceived as expressions of the sovereign power of 
the people, according to the "postulate, in the theory of 
our government, and the very basis of the superstructure, 
that the people are wise, virtuous and competent to manage 
their own affairs" - Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sargent and Rawle, 
330 (1825), (emphasis in text) quoted in Nelson, "Changing 
Conceptions of Judicial Review," 1181. Gibson had ques-
tioned whether judicial interpretation of legislation with 
reference to constitutional texts involved merely legal 
determinations, for repugnance to the constitution was not 
always "self-evident"; the exercise of "political" discre-
tion must be admitted. 
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lawfully vested in the plaintiffs as heirs of their intes-
tate sister, by no "act of despotic power" could the legis-
lature deprive them of their property, with or without com-
pensation: 
Not only because the general provision in the bill of 
rights was deemed sufficiently explicit for that, but 
because it was expected that no Legislature would be so 
regardless of right as to attempt it. Were this reason-
able expectation to be disappointed, it would become our 
plain and imperative duty to obey the immediate and par-
amount will of the people expressed • • • in the adop-
tion of the constitution, rather than the repugnant 
will of their delegates acting under a restricted, but 
transcended authority. 
The right of property, he said, had no foundation or secur-
ity but the law, and "when the Legislature shall success-
fully attempt to overturn it, even in a single instance, the 
liberty of the citizen shall be no more. 1121 
Though no statute was invalidated in Clippinger v. 
Hepbaugh (1843), the case offered another opportunity for 
judicial observations upon legislative ethics. In revers-
ing a verdict whereby an attorney, in the court below, had 
successfully sued for services rendered in procuring a pri-
vate act on a contingency basis, Justice Rogers held that, 
should the court give "legal sanction" to contracts for such 
services, it would be "impossible to foretell the train of 
evils of which it may be the prolific parent." Already the 
legislature had been "contaminated by sinister and improper 
influences. . . • There is at least a wide-spread and grow-
ing suspicion of legislative integrity, which of itself is 
21
watts and Sergeant, 173. 
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an evil of no little magnitude." He believed that contracts 
for contingent fees should be illegal, to avoid improper 
tampering with the people's representatives, for "many pain-
22 ful examples" had already appeared. 
In Commonwealth v. Mann {1843) the court set aside two 
legislative acts which had reduced the salary of a president 
judge of the court of common pleas subsequent to his appoint-
ment. Finding that, under Article 5, Section 2, of the 
Constitution, compensation for justices should not be dimin-
ished during their tenure, Justice Rogers rejected the claim 
made by the state's treasurer that the legislature had the 
power to withdraw a gratuitous increase in salary, and, to 
create additional revenue, to extinguish the state's debts 
by withholding taxes assessed upon salaries of officers of 
the Commonwealth. The case, he said, raised matters of "the 
most grave and important character, involving the construc-
tion of the fundamental principles of government. 1123 His 
sincere respect for a coordinate branch made him reluctant 
to question a legislative exposition of the Constitution, 
but history had taught him to guard the rights of the citi-
zen from the "injustices and gradual encroaclunents of those 
to whom they were compelled to intrust the management of 
their affairs"; experience had taught him that there was no 
better way of destroying the liberties of the people than by 
the government's utilization of a "venal, time-serving, 
225 Watts and Sergeant, 319. 23 5 watts and Sergeant, 405. 
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. . d. . 11 24 timid and subservient JU iciary. Using "copious" 
extracts, for which he knew he would be excused, by able 
commentators of the constitution on the second section of 
the fifth article, he had surely proved that "a power over a 
man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will," and 
therefore: 
To effect a favorite object of legislative ambition, or 
to gratify the vindictive feelings occasioned by the 
phrenzy and madness of party, a successful resort may be 
had, by ~gch means, to the judicial tribunals of the 
country. 
Warming to his subject, he declared that, where the 
departments in a government were separate, the: 
Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always 
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution, because it will be least in a capacity to 
annoy and injure them. • • • It may be truly sai~ to 
have neither force nor will but merely judgment. 6 
It had no influence over sword nor purse, and: 
No direction of either the strength or the wealth of 
society, and can take no active resolution whatever • 
and though individual oppression may now and then pro-
ceed from courts of justice, the general liberty of the 
people can never be endangered from that quarter • • • 
so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from 
both the legislature and the executive. 
If, because of its "natural feebleness," the judiciary were 
in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, "permanent 
tenure of judicial off ices, and an invariable compensation, 
incapable of diminution," would enable it to be considered 
as a "bulwark 0 of a limited constitution. 27 This court, 
24Ibid., 406 (1843). 25Ibid., 406-8. 
26Ibid., 408-9, emphasis in original. 
27 Watts and Sergeant, 410-11 (1843). 
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then would not betray its trust by refusing "to interpose to 
prevent injustice, whether arising from a wilful, deliberate 
and wicked invasion of the Constitution," or from a mistaken 
construction of the legislative authority. The court would 
meet on the threshold the first attempt at encroachment by 
voiding these two acts. 
Although the justice had things to say about infamous 
despotism, "the limits of a judicial opinion" would not 
allow him to pursue this theme. 28 
Putting aside old scruples about judicial review, for 
which, instead, justifications were diligently delivered, 
the court had censured legislative interference with judi-
cial function, contested legislative omnipotence, and warned 
against legislative impiety. The citizen would be sheltered 
from political majoritarianism. 
By 1835, the Supreme Court in Tennessee was no longer 
prepared to tolerate what it considered to be an extravagant 
accretion of power by the legislature: "We are aware of 
what is every day urged, the omnipotence of the legislature; 
that whatever is not forbidden by the Constitution is left 
open for that body to do," Justice Peck said in that year. 
He denounced legislative actions which "step[ped] in the 
place of judicial authority. 1129 The cases in the decade 
following reveal the development of constitutional doctrines 
28Ibid., 421. 
29Richardson v. Wilson, 8 Yerger 79-80 (1835). The case 
involved a plea for alimony following a legislative divorce. 
as principles for the evaluation of legislation, so as to 
curb legislative authority. 
Utilizing the doctrine of natural rights, Justice 
48 
Green, in Jones' Heirs v. Perry (1836), voided a private act 
which had authorized a guardian of infants to sell land 
against a parent's indebtedness. The defendant's counsel 
had claimed that, by the "law of the land," 30 real estate 
was subject to payment of liabilities which descended to 
heirs. Just as title could be divested to settle obliga-
tions by order of the constitution, so might the legislature 
pass a private act authorizing a remedy for a debt. He 
believed that the heirs, though minors, were of age to under-
stand and consent to the sale, and that the act of limita-
tions protected the defendant, who had been in possession 
under the deed of sale for more than seven years. 
The justice held that the private act of 1825 was an 
exercise of judicial authority which deprived the complai-
nants of their property without the judgment of their peers 
or the operation of the law of the land. By the sixth arti-
cle of the constitution, which vested judicial power in the 
courts, the legislature was restrained from encroaching upon 
the jurisdiction of a coordinate department. "In substance,• 
the act of 1825 was a judicial decree which adjudged the 
existence of a debt, and determined its discharge by means 
of a law neither uniform, universal nor permanent in 
3010 Yerger, 67. 
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character. 31 The language of the bill of rights forbade the 
enactment of any law by which an individual's rights were 
abridged. Only by the "judgment of his peers or the law of 
the land" could he be deprived of his life, liberty or pro-
perty; the term "law of the land" implied a "general and 
public law, operating equally upon every member of the com-
munity. "32 
It was "settled law" in Tennessee, Green declared, 
that creditors of an ancestor had no lien upon the lands 
descended to an heir. 33 Though tedious, the course of law 
was available for those to whom debts were owing. Neither 
was an inf ant capable of exercising discreet judgment con-
cerning his possessions; he could not be an agent in their 
sale. Though the defendants had failed to register the deed 
of sale until 1829, their possession there-under from 1826 
barred only the eldest complainant, who was of age within 
the seven-year limit established by statute, from recovery, 
and the title must revert to the others. 
It was the intention of the court, said Green, to 
"check the assumption of an excess power" by the legislature 
promptly, whenever a case occurred, and so "accustom" the 
members to the restraints of the constitution; therefore, 
while on the one hand, the courts: 
Ought to entertain for the legislature the highest 
respect, and to decide against their acts only from the 
31Ibid., 70. 
34Ibid., 71. 
32 10 Yerger, 71. 
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clearest convictions of duty, on the other hand, where 
they are clearly satisfied the constitution is violated, 
they have no alternative but to declare that such act of 
assembly is not law.34 
In Buddv. State (1842), the court again annulled a 
statute deemed partial, this time in the divisive area of 
bank charters. In the court below, Budd, employed as "clerk 
of the individual ledger, 1135 was found guilty of making a 
false entry with a view to defraud the Union Bank, incorpo-
rated by statute in 1832. Justice Reese, referring to the 
22nd section of the act, by which it was made a criminal 
offence for "officers, agents and servants" to attempt to 
cheat the bank, held that, as "clerks" were not specifically 
designated, they were not "properly comprehended and 
described"; that the term clerk was "of such varied import, 
that we are not at liberty to hold that 'clerk,' and espe-
cially 'clerk of the individual ledger,' is equivalent to 
officer, agent or servant. 1136 Neither had the indictment 
specifically indicated that Budd was employed by the bank, 
and therefore he was not properly charged. 
Despite having overturned the judgment, Reese pro-
ceeded to find a: 
Graver and weightier question • • • whether the act of 
1832, which created a felony in relation to officers, 
servants and agents of the Union Bank only, could be 
considered as "the law of the land" consistent with the 
bill of rig~ts.37 
Citing Jones' Heirs, he held that the protection intended to 
3
·
4
rbid., 71. 
36 3 Humphreys, 489. 
353 Humphreys, 488. 
37Ibid., 490. 
51 
be extended to individuals by the bill of rights could not 
be effective where their liberty or property might be 
exposed to the operation of a partial law. He believed that 
the bank could find other effective safeguards which were 
consistent with public liberty. "As to the coordinate 
department," he added: 
To whose enactment we feel unable to give effect, we 
cheerfully acknowledge that their intelligence, and num-
bers, and high motives and sanctions under which they, 
too act, impose upon us the obligation, when comparing 
the result of any deliberation of theirs with the para-
mount law which governs us all, to be well satisfied 
that in declaring a statute invalid and void we but obey 
the mandate of the constitution.38 
In 1844, John H. White, special judge, in Governor v. 
Porter and Sureties, invoked constitutional restrictions 
. 39 
upon a statute which undertook to construe an earlier act. 
Holding that, "as the Constitution is the paramount law," 
whereby each department of government was prohibited from 
"exercising any of the powers properly belonging to any of 
the others," he declared that the legislature could not 
destroy the checks and balances of government by enacting a 
law which, neither repealing nor replacing an earlier sta-
tute, "decide[d] upon its construction." 40 
According to the conditions of the first act, of 1835, 
Porter (a sheriff) had posted a bond in the county court for 
the collection and payment of state taxes for the years 1840 
and 1841. A subsequent act, of 1839-40, required that bonds 
3
·
8
rbid., 493. 39s Humphreys, 167. 
40 5 Humphreys, 168. 
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were to be executed as per the act of 1835, "which shall be 
construed to require said bonds to be given hereafter every 
year. 1141 Porter was indicted in the court below for default 
and delinquency for the year 1841, and his demurrer to the 
plea was sustained. 
Asserting that deficiencies in the drafting of both 
statutes endangered the security of the public revenue by 
permitting it to be plundered by a public officer, Judge 
White declined to construe them liberally so as to render 
them effectual. He therefore voided the later act, declared 
the 1835 act as effective in its terms, reversed the lower 
cour~'s ruling and overruled the demurrer. 42 
In Green v. Allen (1844), the court again stepped in 
to overturn special legislation considered arbitrary in a 
suit which, on appeal from the chancery court, presented for 
the first time in Tennessee the matter of donations to char-
ity. 
The case concerned a will which, by its terms, 
required the executor to sell all property, and to give a 
quarter of the proceeds to the Tennessee Annual Conference 
of the Methodist Episcopal Church (an unincorporated society) 
for the benefit of its schools and missions, and "to be 
otherwise disposed of" as the society thought fit. 43 In an 
of 
41 Ibid., 168. 
42
rbid., 168-9. Thereby depriving the crafty sheriff 
the loophole perceived in the 1839-40 statute. 
43 5 Humphreys, 170. 
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elaborate and lengthy opinion, in which he investigated the 
44 
medieval and colonial backgrounds of bequests, to show 
that donations for charitable and pious purposes had long 
been subject to abuse, Justice Turley held that a Tennessee 
court of chancery had no jurisdiction over a trust "when it 
is mixed up with general moral duty • it must be of such 
a tangible nature that the court can deal with it." 45 There 
was no power in such a court similar to that of the Lord 
Chancellor in England who, as an agent of the crown, exer-
cised personal jurisdiction over the use and administration 
of bequests considered general and indefinite; this would be 
inconsistent with the constitution of the state as being a 
"branch of executive prerogative." 46 Further, as a charity 
"must stand or fall as it was found to exist at the death of 
the testator, if it were not then legal and valid, no subse-
quent statute of the legislature can make it good." 47 The 
appointment, under a special act of 1841, of trustees to 
receive the bequest on behalf of the Methodist Episcopal 
Society membership, was not only too late, but was an exer-
cise of judicial function. Indeed, the act was unconstitu-
tional and void under Article 7, Section 11, which prohibi-
ted the passage of partial laws for the benefit of 
44Ibid., 179, 189: an "investigation alarming in its 
extent an<rperplexity" for searching for some principles of 
chancery jurisdiction was "like looking for a live body in 
an Egyptian catacomb." 
455 Hum h 194 46Ibi"d., 206. p reys, • 
47Ibid., 209. 
particular individuals. He could not, therefore, sustain 
the validity of the bequest, which was declared unenforce-
able. 48 
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While articulating justifications for judicial review, 
the Tennessee court had used constitutional precepts and 
procedural formulae to defeat special legislation where, it 
stated, arbitrary legislative power had led to abuses, con-
fusion and uncertainty. The New York court, in this period, 
expanded the overview of legislation, applying traditional 
doctrines and forms to challenge statutes deemed tainted 
with tyranny, and developing rules of interpretation to max-
imize their discretion and authority. The first three cases 
deal with the eminent domain power, which had been utilized 
aggressively by the legislature for public improvement. 
The first comprehended the principle of compensation 
and the concerns of state economic planners for low costs in 
the development of water transportation. In People v. Canal 
Appraisers (1835), the owner of a millsite impaired by the 
construction of the Erie Canal, having proved his title by 
jury verdict in the court below, sued for compensation for 
injuries resulting from the diversion of water into a sloop 
lock. The defendants' counsel claimed that, by an act 
passed in 1792, the state, exercising its sovereign power, 
had granted to the canal company as a "free gift" the stream 
upon which the millsite stooa. 49 As the common law 
4
·
8Ibid., 210. 49 13 Wendell, 363. 
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principle with regard to navigable rivers did not apply in 
the state, owners of adjoining banks could not be regarded 
as holding title to the streams. Justice Jacob Sutherland, 
declining to discuss whether the English common law test 
were applicable "to the nature and extent of our inland 
streams," 50 held that, though the legislature "appear to 
have overlooked or disregarded" the principle of the common 
law in granting islands to other individuals, as separate 
and distinct from the land on their respective banks, it was 
his contention that the relater was the owner to the middle 
of the stream. 51 Therefore, "when private property is 
destroyed, and its beneficial enjoyment is essentially 
impaired in the prosecution of public works, the owner is 
entitled to compensation." Damages must be appraised for 
the southern half of the stream. 52 
In 1839, the court again enunciated firm principles 
for the evaluation of legislation involving the eminent 
domain power. In The Matter of John and Cherry Streets, an 
1818 statute had established the procedure whereby the City 
of New York might improve any street or public place, the 
court reviewing the estimates and assessments made by 
SOibid., 371. If the rivers were subject to the ebb 
and flow-or-the tide, they were regarded as non-navigable 
under the test of the English common law. There were, in 
contrast to the English isle, navigable fresh water rivers 
in America, in which the tide did not ebb and flow. In 1836, 
keeping a finger on the pulse of change, the court rejected 
the common law rule: ca·nal Appraisers v. The People, 17 
Wendell, 571. 
51 Ibid., 372. 52Ibid., 373. 
court-appointed commissioners for the Corporation and any 
objection thereto. Justice Cowen, observing that it was 
difficult for a judge to dismiss as unfair estimates by 
experts in the field, where present and future valuations 
had to be considered, stated that he would not reject a 
report where the proceedings were regular, and where "no 
error in principle" were evident. 53 He had found no ade-
56 
quate ground for the reconsideration of damage awards to the 
individual objectors in the case, but questioned whether the 
Corporation might legally take as its own, and for a nominal 
price, a triangular piece of property belonging to unknown 
owners, in the closing and straightening of John Street, and 
narrow strips of land, also of owners unknown, from which 
the proposed new Cherry Street receded. Was not this: 
Incompatible with that part of the state constitution 
which declared that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law ••• 
unless it were a taking of property for public use, or, 
in other words~ an exercise of the national right of 
eminent doman?~4 
The common law recognized title of owners adjacent to public 
highways to the centre of the road, subject only to the pub-
lic right of way. Therefore, where a street were discontin-
ued in part or in whole, the rules applied. Consequently, 
as a statute was void which authorized the transfer of pro-
perty without the consent of the owners, he referred the 
report back to the commissioners for reconsideration and 
53 19 Wendell, 670. 
54Ibid., 666. 
correction by assigning the property awarded to the 
Corporation to the adjacent property owners.SS 
In 1843, in the face of a sharp dissent by Chief 
S7 
Justice Samuel Nelson, the court rejected the orthodox view 
of public purpose in the invasion of property through the 
power of eminent domain. In Taylor v. Porter and Ford, 
Justice Bronson struck down as unconstitutional a colonial 
statute passed in 1772, which, according to Nelson, had been 
If' I t' I .. s6 b h' h 1 d in active opera ion ever since, y w ic an owners were 
able to build private roads through others' property, with 
damages assessed. Utilizing the doctrine of natural rights, 
whereby the people, who alone had absolute sovereignty, 
could not be deprived of their property except by "the law 
of the land" (which, according to Coke and Kent, meant "due 
process of law 11 S7), he limited the exercise of legislative 
authority to "such powers as have been delegated to it. • • • 
Neither liberty nor property, except when forfeited by crime, 
or when the latter is taken for public use, falls within the 
scope of the power."S8 
Though it was a "grave matter" to declare an act of 
the legislature unconstitutional,sg the judiciary would 
55Ibid., 677. Besides, he said, although the 
Corporation had "always sold [property taken] to the adja-
cent owners at the nominal prices which they gave," under 
the principle of eminent domain, any municipal court could 
become "legal purchasers on summary appraisal, and then sell 
out to individuals," perhaps third parties. 
S64 Hill, 1S2. S7Ibid., 146. 
58Ibid., 145. 59Ibid., 143. 
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decide whether public purpose adheredtothe taking of pri-
vate property. He feared that there was otherwise no consti-
tutional barrier to uncompensated takings: "If the power 
exists to take the property of one man without his consent 
and transfer it to another, it may be exercised without any 
. f . ..60 reference to the question o compensation. 
As Justice Nelson's dissent suggests, the court had 
rejected the hitherto utilitarian justification for the use 
of the eminent domain power: 
Works of this nature are indispensible to the prosper-
ity of the country •••• So intimately are they inter-
woven with individual enterprise and the public welfare 
that their establishment and regulation have hitherto 
been regarded as an essential branch of internal 
police. 6 1 
By creating a distinction between public and private 
appropriations under this power, the court gave notice that 
legislatively authorized acquisitions would no longer be 
upheld simply because they furthered the state's economic 
improvement. By means of "the law of the land" and "natural 
rights," the court had reversed its earlier trend of support 
for legislative encouragement of economic growth through the 
use of the doctrine of eminent domain. What is significant 
about this case is the development of a substantive as well 
as a procedural concept of due process: "The legislative 
power of this state does not reach to such an unwarrantable 
GO Ibid., 148. 
6
·
1 Ibid., 150. 
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extent." 62 How striking a vindication of judicial review of 
"public use," as against the legislative view. 
In People v. Kane, the court, in 1840, moving to other 
matters, rejected an attempt by the City of Albany to assert 
local political autonomy by exercising its power over that 
of the governor of the state. Chief Justice Nelson, a con-
servative Democrat who had participated in the New York 
Constitutional Convention of 1821, 63 held that a legisla-
tive act of 1826, which gave to the Common Council of Albany 
the power to appoint police justices, was "clearly in con-
f lict with the 7th section of the 4th Article of the 
Constitution," as adopted by the people in 1822, which pro-
vided that all judicial officers were to be appointed by the 
governor and senate. As the functions of police justices 
were "wholly of a judicial character," they were to be 
appointed as the Constitution directed, 64 and Kane, named by 
the Council of the City to the position in 1838, had 
"intruded into the office. 1165 
This challenge to a relatively old statute, which had 
stood for 14 years, suggests that the court was adopting a 
new, more rigorous attitude towards the overview of legisla-
tion. In 1841, the court, per the Chief Justice, held that 
an act of the legislature of 1814 would have been null and 
62 4 Hill, 145. 
63Robert E. Cushman, Dict:k>nary of American Biography, 
VII, 411. 
64 23 Wendell, 417. 65Ibid., 414. 
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void as against the complainants had they not deprived them-
selves of the right to object to its constitutionality. In 
Van Hook v. Whitlock, creditors of an insurance company 
incorporated in 1805, sued the stockholders, who were under 
individual liability, for debts contracted prior to the pas-
sage of an act of 1814, whereby, upon their insolvency, 
insurance companies were declared exempt from personal lia-
bility. Had the complainants not accepted the dividends, 
amounting to 51 percent of the debts, after the dissolution of 
the company in 1814, the act of that year would have been in 
violation of the Constitution of the United States as impair-
ing the obligation of contracts. 66 
In Purdy v. People, in 1842, on error from the Supreme 
Court, an act of May, 1840, which altered the charter of the 
City of New York, succumbed to the constitutional test by a 
narrow majority in the Court for the Correction of Errors. 67 
Four senators, speaking for that predominantly Democratic 
body, and against the Chancellor, held that the constitution 
of the state, in Article 7, Section 9, required the assent 
of two-thirds of the members of each branch to alter or 
renew "any body politic or corporate. 1168 Therefore, the act 
"For the Better Organization of the Criminal Courts of the 
6626 Wendell, 43. 
67At this time, under the constitution of 1821, it was 
New York's highest court, which consisted of the president 
of the Senate, the senators, the Chancellor and the justices 
of the Supreme Court. 
68 4 Hill, 393. 
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City," which excluded the aldermen from sitting as judges of 
the Court of General Sessions, and was passed as a simple 
majority bill, was unconstitutional. Denying the 
Chancellor's claim that municipal corporations, as public 
corporations, were not embraced by the constitutional provi-
sion, which was intended to guard against the "too rapid 
multiplication of bank charters and the legislative corrup-
tion which their creation induced," the court called for a 
return to the: 
Old and revered doctrine of strict construction - the 
only sound and safe doctrine for the government of 
either judges or legislators •••• Nothing can be more 
dangerous to our free institutions, or the rights of the 
people, than to encourage doubtful interpretations of 
the Constitution, contrary to its more plain and natural 
import, as understood by the great body of its readers.69 
In 1845, the court, challenging the reformist tenden-
cies of the legislature, overturned its political judgment 
on the sensitive issue of banks in De Bow v. the People. 
The defendant had been convicted in the court below of pass-
ing counterfeit bank notes with the intent to defraud the 
Bank of Warsaw. His counsel had charged that no such bank 
existed in law, as the general Banking Act of 1838, under 
which the associates had intended to become operative as 
the Bank of Warsaw, had not been passed by a vote of two-
thirds of the members of the legislature, and was therefore 
invalid. Bronson, now Chief Justice, held that the defen-
dant was improperly convicted, as there was no such legal 
694 Hill 398, 419. 
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being as the Bank of Warsaw. Citing Purdy as precedent, he 
declared that the two-thirds clause extended to all corpora-
tions, as the constitution, "in unequivocal terms," had 
declared. The safety of free institutions, he believed, 
depended upon a "strict adherence to the fundamental law, 
whatever we may think of the wisdom and expediency of its 
provisions"; he would censure any attempt to disregard the 
"explicit language" in favour of what some might choose to 
consider the "intent and meaning" of the constitution. 70 
This "strict adherence" to constitutional safeguards 
caused Bronson, in People v. Warner (1845), to declare an 
act of 1843, which created the office of clerk of the Court 
of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York, null 
and void. The constitution, Article 4, Section 8, of 1821, 
he declared, had directed that the position should be filled 
as a dual role, by the elected clerk of the city and county. 
As the new off ice would be filled by the court, the electors 
would be deprived of their right: "If the office may be 
divided, and the duties assigned to two officers, both must 
be chosen by the electors of the county. No other rule will 
give full effect to the constitution. 1171 
By the time the court ruled on Quakenbush v. Danks 
(1845), the use of legal procedures to maximize judicial 
authority had become settled technique. The case concerned 
a sheriff's deputy who had been directed, in 1843, to 
70 1 Denio, 13, 18. 71 7 Hill, 82. 
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recover from Danks a debt for which he had been judged lia-
ble in 1837. For this reason, his horse and harness, the 
only property not covered by the exemption laws passed prior 
to 1842, were taken, though he insisted that they were neces-
sary to the support of his family. In the court below, his 
counsel had claimed that under the new Exemption Law of 1842, 
all of Danks' property was exempt from sale on execution, 
and the jury returned a verdict for him. Bronson, overturn-
ing this finding, held that the Exemption Law of 1842, "in 
general words," was broad enough to cover debts contracted 
prior to its passage, but it ought not to be applied to the 
cas~ in hand, otherwise "it may be a moral, but it is no 
longer the legal duty of the debtor to pay." A statute 
should not be construed retrospectively; the "rule of jus-
tice and honesty" required that every law should, if possi-
ble, be so interpreted that no wrong would be done. There-
fore, property subject to execution at the time the debt was 
contracted must remain subject to execution until the debt 
.d 12 . was pai • The legislature "cannot legislate backwards and 
annul the force of prior obligations," therefore the 
Exemption Law of 1842, when applied to past transactions, 
must be set aside. 73 
"In the United States," Tocqueville had written, "the 
Constitution governs the legislature as much as the private 
citizen"; legal tribunals obey the Constitution "in 
72 1 Denio, 131. 73Ibid., 133. 
64 
preference to any law. 1174 Though reflecting a current 
understanding of the bench's power to strike down legisla-
tive acts, Tocqueville did not undervalue its potential to 
subvert legislative supremacy. Aware that burgeoning parti-
san sentiment gave to their decisions a grave and delicate 
character, the courts, claiming allegiance to the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the land, developed doc-
trines for the evaluation of legislation which placed sub-
stantive restraints on legislative power. The great princi-
ples of republican government, higher law and the Bills of 
Rights, provided authoritative legal precepts to temper per-
ceived crude and arbitrary legislation. Where the protec-
tion of minority rights through judicial review promoted 
progress according to the judicial conception of social 
order and harmony, the judiciary functioned as a restraint 
upon Tocqueville's rnajoritarian tyranny. Vested interests 
in property, politics and economic enterprise were safe-
guarded by the conservative bar to keep the nation loyal to 
their notion of America's social identity. 
74T 0 11 D . · • • ocquevi e, emocracy in America, I, 101. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Judiciary and Individual Rights 
Tocqueville's majoritarian thesis stresses that the 
moral authority of the many could, with its subtle conform-
ing pressures, restrain the individual from the development 
and expression of novel ideas and uncommon beliefs; that the 
presiding sense of the community, cherishing its creed, 
would correct and discipline unorthodox opinion, admitting 
no dissidence. Only humanity, reason and justice could shel-
ter the insubordinate freethinker in the moral world, and, 
in the political world, vested rights. 1 
Yet, if the Constitution withdrew from partisan debate 
certain agreed upon essentials, and these, inscribed in the 
Declarations of Rights, were defended against encroachment, 
was the individual as secure in his civil liberties within 
the institutional sphere of judicial authority as 
Tocqueville suggested? As usual, he offered a shrewd 
insight into the nature and creative potentialities of the 
judicial function: "Lawyers are attached to public order 
beyond every other consideration." 2 This basic assumption 
1Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 263-5, 416. 
2Ibid., 275. 
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determines the following four cases. In the first, a breach 
of the spiritual peace was condemned lest it place the har-
many of society in jeopardy. 
Abner Kneeland is described by a biographer as a 
refined and courteous man, of sincerity, courage and purity 
of character. Sometime Baptist and Universalist minister, 
translator of the New Testament, and editor of several 
Christian papers which championed liberal notions, his reli-
gious views had, by 1830, veered towards the extreme, and 
he expounded pantheistic beliefs from the podium of the 
First Society of Free Inquirers. 3 He was a Jackson man 
whose lectures both in person and print drew large audi-
4 
ences. In early 1834, under an act against blasphemy 
passed in 1782, Kneeland was indicted for having "unlawfully 
and wickedly" published a "scandalous, impious, obscene, 
blasphemous and profane libel" on the existence of God in 
the Boston Investigator. Contained in a public letter, 
which he had written to a Universalist periodical, it said 
in part-: "Universalists believe in god which I do not; but 
believe that their god, with all his moral attributes • 
is nothing more than a chimera of their own imagination." 
Upon conviction Kneeland appealed, enduring three trials 
before Justices Putnam and Wilde, yet remaining in the 
3
williarn H. Allison, Dictionary of· America·n Biography, 
v, ii, 457-8. 
4 Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice 
Shaw, 43. 
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shadow of prison. He made a final plea to the full bench of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, and his case was heard in 1836. 5 
Acting as his own counsel, Kneeland protested that the 
public letter addressed to the Universalists did not consti-
tute a denial of God within the meaning of the statute. He 
had, he said, simply expressed a disbelief, or doubt, in the 
creed of the Universalists; he was himself a pantheist. 6 He 
was satisfied, however, that the act of 1782 was unconstitu-
tional, for it violated Article 2 of the Declaration of 
Rights which safeguarded a subject in his "religious profes-
sions and sentiments"; it infringed Article 16, which guar-
ante.ed the right to propagate sentiments in the press, 
unless slanderous; it impaired the nation's law of naturali-
zation which gave to all faiths the rights of citizens. 
Expressing regret that the defendant had chosen to 
represent himself, 7 to the derogation of his case, Chief 
Justice Shaw, for the predominantly Unitarian court, sus-
tained Kneeland's conviction. Though the two-year delay in 
handing down the decision had been occasioned by the "intrin-
sic difficulty attending some of the questions raised in the 
520 Pick, 206 (1838). 
6Ibid., 207. Kneeland was mindful, it appears, of the 
traditional rejection of the atheist's testimony. 
7Ibid., 266: Morton's dissent was based on Wilde's 
instructions to the jury in the lower court, which he con-
sidered to be a mistaken view of the law. He regretted that 
Kneeland, "unversed in some of the distinctions and princi-
ples of criminal law," had failed to make use of a "techni-
cal form," which would at least have left the door open for 
another trial. 
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case, and a difference of opinion among the judges, 118 he 
believed that there was now "no doubt" that Kneeland's pub-
lie letter constituted blasphemy within the meaning of the 
statute. 9 Blasphemy, he said, could be described as a "wil-
ful and malicious attempt to lessen man's reverence for God, 
by denying his existence, or his attributes as an intelli-
gent creator, governor and judge of men," and the statute 
prohibited the "wilful denial of God • • • with an intent 
to impair and destroy the reverence due to him." 10 Upon 
studying the other parts of Kneeland's publication to dis-
cern the motive and intent behind the words, so that the 
language would be understood as to its true meaning, it was 
his perception that the letter contemplated a denial of the 
existence of God rather than an expression of Kneeland's 
disbelief in the Universalists' conception of god. There-
fore, it was to be "taken as proved" that the language was 
used with the purpose and design of denying God, and this 
gave sufficient grounds for conviction under the statute. 11 
It was "somewhat late," suggested Shaw, to question 
the validity of the statute. 12 A SO-year record, and recent 
re-enactment after careful revision, demanded respect. 
Neighbouring states had declared blasphemy to be a crime at 
820 Pickering, 211. 
10
rbid., 213. 
12Ibid., 218. 
9Ibid., 216. 
11 Ibid., 217. 
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common law, and Kent, in People v. Ruggles 13 had emphasized 
the inherent Christianity of the common law which, it was 
imputed, Kneeland had now offended. He was not protected by 
Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Nar-
rowing its scope to the common law definition of a free 
press, Shaw construed it to mean only an absence of prior 
restraint, which left the individual citizen responsible for 
all offences committed through language, printed or oral. 
Any other construction, he said, would suggest a general 
license to pen scandal and calumny or provoke incitement, 
and this he deemed absurd, impractical, and inconsistent 
with the existence of free government. 
Nor could Shaw find in Article 2, which guaranteed 
religious liberty, any reason for invalidating the statute, 
for its intent was merely to "restrain and punish acts which 
have a tendency to disturb the public peace," such as wil-
fully blaspheming the holy name of God. It did not prohibit 
free discussion for the "honest purpose" of discovering 
truth, nor even the "simple and sincere avowal of a disbe-
lief in the existence of a supreme, intelligent being. 1114 
In his dissent, Justice Morton, Democrat, civil 
13 Johnson's Repo·rts (New York) 290 ( 1811) • Ruggles 
was a "toper in New York who, being ejected from a tavern, 
stood in the street and shouted that Jesus Christ was a bas-
tard and Mary a whore," which Chancellor Kent regarded as an 
outrage upon public decorum. Open blasphemy, he said, which 
reviled the religions professed by almost the whole commun-
ity, was inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state: 
Miller, The ·Life of the Mind in America, 194. 
1420 Pickering, 221. 
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libertarian and Baptist, focused upon Kneeland's contention 
that the statute against blasphemy infringed upon freedom of 
conscience, of discussion, and of the press. Yet the power 
to declare a statute void, "high, delicate, if not danger-
ous," demanded great prudence, particularly when such sta-
tute had received frequent legislative attention. 15 The 
history of the freedom of the press, he declared, suggested 
that the framers of the constitution wished to prohibit cen-
sorship only by means of previous restraints, and no immun-
ity from liability for injuries inflicted on others was 
offered. From the formation of the government of 
Massachusetts, libels had been deemed to be crimes, and pun-
ished "by virtue of a constitutional adoption of the common 
law," therefore it was his intention to accept the constitu-
tionality of the law, and await the voice of the people 
through the legislative channel in a definition of those who 
disturbed the peace with malicious falsehoods, or obscene or 
profane publications or exhibitions. 16 
Article 2, Morton believed, secured to the individual 
freedom to worship God according to his conscience, provided 
that he did not disturb the public peace, and the right to 
advocate and disseminate his thoughts, if they did not wound 
the feelings of others. This "clearly [did] not include 
atheists," whose sentiments and expressions could hardly be 
called religion. Yet a broad view, which sanctioned the 
15Ibid., 227. 1620 Pickering, 233. 
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protection of all beliefs and disbeliefs upon the subject of 
religions could honour the natural transformations of faith, 
for which man was responsible to the Deity alone. 17 
These two articles, therefore, guaranteed, in his view, 
the right of every citizen to "form, enjoy and promulgate 
such opinions upon any subject as his own judgment shall die-
t t .. 1a a e. Any law which punished a denial of God couched in 
language inferring a bad intent to wound feelings and cor-
rupt principles, must be deemed constitutional. A "wilful" 
denial was not of itself blasphemy, for wilful meant inten-
tional or, at worst, obstinacy, and "every person has a con-
stitutional right to discuss the subject of God and to 
affirm or deny his existence." To constitute a crime, 
"there must be an infringement of the rights of others and a 
malicious purpose. 1119 Criminality depended upon construe-
tive intent. 
"This conviction," Morton said, "rests very heavily 
upon my mind." 2° Clearly he feared that the court had been 
guilty of religious persecution. Though he believed 
Kneeland's public letter had been correctly interpreted as 
an intentional denial of God, this, he was persuaded, 
Kneeland had a legal right to do. 
Commonwealth v. Blackington (1837) concerned an attempt 
by the enemies of temperance reform in Massachusetts to 
17 Ibid. I 233. 
19Ibid., 244-5. 
18Ibid., 236. 
20ibid., 245. 
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break government regulation of the liquor trade. The defen-
dant had been indicted under an 1832 statute for retailing 
spiritous liquors without a license. He contended in the 
lower court that he had been a licensed retailer in 1835, 
and that the county commissioners, left to their discretion 
by law to license as many applicants as they believed the 
public good might require, had refused to grant any licenses 
the following year. The effect of this stand, he maintained, 
was to restore to every citizen of the county the right to 
sell, but the court instructed the jury that the commis-
sioners' neglect did not constitute a legal defence, and the 
jury found against him. 
The defendant's counsel, Robert Rantoul, argued that 
the liquor law was unconstitutional as an invasion of pro-
perty rights, and as a violation both of the equal privi-
leges clause of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
the act of 1837. The Chief Justice rejected the contention 
that, where a power was not lawfully exercised by one quali-
fied, it might be legally appropriated by an unqualified 
individual. Neither was the statute of 1832 voided by the 
1837 act, which conferred upon the county commissioners the 
authority to refuse all licenses, even though it seemed to 
infer that, at the time of the offence under indictment, 
this power was wanting. He believed that the statute of 
of 1837 was "rather a declaration of what the true meaning 
of what the former act was, than an enactment introductive 
of a new law. 1121 
Of greater moment was, however, the objection to the 
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liquor license laws as contrary to the constitution of the 
Commonwealth. Cognizant as he was, that the judicial depart-
ment was clearly vested with the power of review, it would 
be utilized only with "great caution and deliberation. 1122 
For the state's constitution establishing as it did a few 
fundamental principles to guide each department in the ful-
filment of its functions, and securing through the 
Declaration of Rights a social order long enjoyed under a 
government "nearly as free, and practically nearly as popu-
lar, as the lot of humanity would admit," had invested in 
the legislature the: 
Full power and authority to make, ordain, and establish 
all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws ••• 
not repugnant to the constitution • • • as they shall 
judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth • 
• • • The power is the general rule, the restraint of it 
the specific exception.23 
In discussing, therefore, those natural rights which 
the defendant believed had been circumscribed, Shaw declared 
that laws, designed to "define, secure and give practical 
efficacy" to the right to acquire and possess property, 
which had been a subject of legislative solicitude since the 
first settlement of the country, imposed salutary regula-
tions to benefit or protect commerce and trade, through 
21 12 Pickering, 352. 
23Ibid., 356-7. 
22 12 Pickering, 356. 
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which property was procured, and had never been deemed 
unconstitutional. All inspection and licensing laws were of 
this nature, made "with a view to revenue, to health, to 
peace and good morals"; spiritous liquors, though not neces-
sarily immoral, tended to "immorality, or other mischief or 
inconvenience to the community or to individuals. 1124 Nei-
ther did the licensing laws infringe the exclusive privi-
leges clause of the Declaration of Rights, for these fran-
chises were granted for services and duties "rendered at the 
times and in the manner most beneficial to the public," 
which meant that the security, morals and good order of the 
community were promoted. This "obvious purpose" rendered it 
free from any censure in the context of vested rights. 25 
In Commonwealth v. Jailer of Alleghany County (1838), 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, interpreting the constitu-
tional guarantee of the 14th section of the state's 
Declaration of Rights, that the "privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless where in case of 
rebellion or invasions the public safety may require it," 
refused the privilege to a prisoner deemed still infectious 
from small pox. Stating that the purpose of the section was 
"to prevent wilful and oppressive delay," the court believed 
that it was serving the legitimate needs of society by rais-
ing an exception to the "letter of the act: "A court is not 
24Ibid., 357. 25Ibid., 358. 
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bound to peril life in an attempt to perform what was not 
d d b • d f "t n26 inten e to e require o i • 
In Maxon v. Annas (1845), the Chief Justice of New 
York's Supreme Court refused the "tranquilizing suste-
nance1127 of a Sunday law to a Seventh Day Baptist. In the 
lower court, where the trial was held on a Saturday, a judg-
ment was rendered against the plaintiff for damages, and his 
wagon and cutter were sold. Bronson, in construing the sta-
tute of 1839, "In relation to the Seventh Day Baptists," 28 
found that, though the law protected the plaintiff from any 
"writ, process, warrant, order, judgment, decree or other 
proceeding of any court," he was not sheltered from judgment 
that was rendered: "The rendition is a very different thing 
from the execution of a judgment." 29 Though, at the common 
law, Sunday was dies ~ judicus, and though a state law 
declared that no court could transact business on Sunday 
except to receive a verdict or discharge a jury, no such 
requirements pertained to Saturday. If the process in the 
lower court was made returnable at a time when the defendant 
could not conscientiously attend to make his defence, the 
plaintiff deserved the "serverest censure," but the judgment 
could not be voided. 30 
26 7 Watts, 366. 
27Mark De Wolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: 
Religions and Government in American Constitutional History 
(Chicago, 1965), 96. 
28 1 D " 205 _ enio, • 29Ibid., 206. 
301 Denio, 207. 
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By using the principle of non-establistu~ent in the 
religious guarantee clause, an assurance that liberty would 
not be infringed, the court could have made an effort to 
safeguard Maxon's spiritual commitment to his creed, but 
freedom of religion was not to be understood as a philosoph-
ical absolute. Even as the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus, the most basic of all protections against the author-
ity of the state, was subject to interpretation, the courts 
could, in their decisions, substantially influence both the 
structure and atmosphere of democratic life. 
Americans, Tocqueville had written, acknowledged the 
moral authority of the reason of the community as they 
acknowledge the political authority of the mass of the citi-
zens, and "they hold that public opinion is the surest arbi-
ter of what is lawful or forbidden, true or false. 1131 Yet, 
the power of the majority was itself not unlimited--"above 
it in the political world [are] vested rights. 1132 Further, 
the judge was "most strictly bound" to obey the Constitution, 
which was the "origin of all authority the first of 
laws. 1133 These four cases suggest, however, that 
Tocqueville, despite his intimate knowledge of, and insights 
into, the capabilities and caprices of lawyers, had mis-
judged the willingness of the bench, "the most powerful 
31 Tocqueville, D'emoc·racy in America, I, 393. 
32
·Ibid., 416. 33Ibid., 100-1. 
34 
existing security against the excesses of democracy," to 
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protect minority rights against majoritarian views which the 
judges shared. Herein lies the proof--and the paradox--of 
Tocqueville's majoritarian thesis. 
34Ibid., 273. 
CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the doctrine 
of judicial review had matured; general public acquiescence 
therein appears to have been attained. The power equation 
between legislature and judiciary had been subtly reshaped. 
Why? 
Despite its auspicious beginnings as the primary 
department of government in the early decades after the 
Revolution; despite the enlightened accomplishment of consti-
tutions and bills of rights, and the momentum gained in this 
creative period, the potential of legislative promise was 
unfulfilled. Though there were leaders of exceptional abil-
ity, such as Calhoun and Webster, the mass of legislators 
justified Tocqueville's complaint that the race of American 
statesmen had dwindled. 1 Because the preparation of bills 
was delegated to legislative committees, a system, as 
Tocqueville had noted, which lacked method and continuity, 
legislation was often imperfect, and amendments and supple-
ments created confusion and uncertainty. Special 
1Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 200, 204: "On 
entering the House of Representatives at Washington, one is 
struck by the vulgar demeanour of the great assembly • • • 
its members are almost all obscure individuals." 
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legislation, which raised questions about the separation of 
powers, and dubious influence, gave rise to much litigation, 
and led to provisions in state constitutions to prohibit or 
limit its use. 2 Scepticism of legislators who, unemcumbered 
by scruples, embarked upon extravagant internal improvement 
schemes which led to the financial collapse of several 
states following the panic of 1837, transformed the atti-
tudes of many regarding the proper use of public credit, and 
led to the drafting of new constitutions in the 1840's. 
Tocqueville's majority, therefore, searching for a workable 
solution through the medium of constitutional conventions, 
placed substantial limitations upon legislative discretion, 
and, to diffuse political authority, increased the number of 
elected officials, including judges, subjecting themselves, 
as Tocqueville would say, to the necessity of "refining 
[their] discretion and improving [their] choice." 3 
The determinate illustration of the failure of the 
legislature as the crucible of the people's will lies in the 
collapse of the codification movement. During this, the for-
mative era, when it was deemed necessary to give effect to 
the maxims of the common law which, in large part, had been 
incorporated in the national and state constitutions, 
2Pound, The Formative Era of American Law, 53-4, 65-8. 
3Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 205. The indi-
rect election of the senate appealed to him. He felt that 
it would avoid the risk of "perishing miserably amongst the 
shoals of democracy." See also Kelly and Harbison, The 
American Constitution, 322-3. 
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codification, Roscoe Pound believed,could only be accom-
plished efficaciously after an era of legal maturity, "which 
was still well in the future. 114 Though some few codes 
received legislative sanction in the 1830's, in general they 
lost out to "the lawyers' desire to monopolize a profitable 
5 mystery." The future lay in judicial finding rather than 
the legislative declaration of law in codes. 
Though the Democracy had created the framework for the 
egalitarian revolution, and had captured the public mind, 
the reactionary thrust of Democratic social belief 
obstructed the impulse of popular rule. Pursuing the 
Jeffersonian myth of a simple, frugal goverrunent, the 
party's commitment to minimum administration hindered the 
regulation and supervision of the public's subsidies in 
4Pound, The Formative Era of American Law, 154, 3: He 
dates the formative era from the establishment of the 
Constitution to the Civil War. 
5Miller, The Life of the Mind in America, 253. Haar, 
in The Golden Age of American Law, 232, quotes a member of 
Kentucky's constitutional convention in 1849, who protested 
the "great expense" of codification incurred in the State of 
Louisiana, but this argument was probably spurious. Of more 
moment was the determination of the legal profession to pro-
tect its vested interest in special knowledge and procedures; 
the suggestion that no established legal rules could be so 
perfect that they could be preserved in changing social con-
ditions, that the law was already too technical for Everyman 
to be his own lawyer, and that the common law was suffi-
ciently systematized (and depoliticized) by the great commen-
taries, which, in Pound's view, were the "stabilizing agency" 
of change. Pound, The Formative Era, 143. Of course, the 
rift between slave and free states augmented the obstacles 
in the way of general codification, for code provisions, 
once enacted, would represent absolute values, which would 
be held binding. To bury national peculiarities within a 
general formula appeared to be impossible. 
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. t . 6 private en erprise. Further, determination to resist 
reforms from the North caused pro-slavery Democrats to check 
the momentum towards universal white male suffrage in the 
South, 7 and to organize congressional "gag" resolutions in 
1836. 8 Philosophical sensitivities regarding the inherent 
inequality of persons not only inevitably opposed the exten-
sion of the vote to Northern blacks, but completed, in 1844, 
the undemocratic tendency to remove the suffrage from 
women. 9 
Nor was the era's supposed egalitarianism reflected in 
the president's conception that, as the national leader, 
political predominance belonged to him. The bank veto pro-
vides a crucial example. Though he correctly perceived 
6
wallace D. Farnham, "the Weakened Spring of 
Government," American Historical Review, 68 (1963), 662-80, 
where he discussed the lack of a defined policy towards 
emerging issues. However, the people's representatives were 
no less eager, on occasion, to still the popular voice, for, 
seeking to stimulate economic development in five states in 
1830-5, they suppressed the popular role in the assessment 
of damages arising out of public works by eliminating the 
jury: Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 143. 
7
schwartz, The Law in America, 45: For instance, giv-
ing to the conservatives, led by the aged John Marshall, a 
victory in the Virginia Convention of 1839-40. 
8Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Justice under the Law, 9, to 
muzzle abolitionists. 
9Edward Pessen, Jacksonian America, Society, 
Personality and Politics (Chicago, 1969), 87: Women pos-
sessed the vote in the first years of the Revolution in sev-
eral states. The Jacksonian era witnessed the deprivation 
of this right in state after state, ending with New York in 
1844. Ibid., 322: The Van Burenites in New York "took the 
lead in modifying the state constitution to make it close to 
impossible that any citizen of color would vote." Ninety-
three percent of Northern blacks lived in states which 
deprived them of the suffrage. 
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Jackson to be both the master and servant of the Democratic 
party, Tocqueville believed that he would not forfeit his 
political position by imprudently elevating the executive 
role. 10 In this he was wrong. Realizing the potential 
latent in the executive office, Jackson evolved a new concep-
tion of presidential authority and new instruments of power 
over the people by his use of the veto, by his position as 
party leader, and by his control of appointments and remo-
vals. Similarly, popular influence in the major parties was 
"more nominal than real": state political machines were 
essentially impervious to the people's control. 11 
The traditionalism of the political establishment in 
Washington, and its espousing of the ideology of laissez 
faire and rugged individualism, determined the fundamental 
failure of the Democracy to shape the course of economic 
development during crucial transition years. This individu-
alist, activist bias of Jacksonianism, with its stress on 
the free, responsible will of the individual in a challeng-
ing social and physical environment, limited the authority 
of government to interfere with the autonomy of private deci-
sion makers. Indeed, preference for the delegation of power 
over the general public appeared "natural to the times. 1112 
Great distances and federalism, scarce cash and problems 
10 ·11 . . Tocquevi e, Democracy in America, I, 413-4. 
11 p J• k .. . . 340 essen, ac sonian America, • 
12Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in 
Nineteenth Century United States, 65. 
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over a tax base, and the Democracy's failure to fashion an 
efficient bureacracy because of the Spoils System (itself 
hardly democratic), invited the development of a variety of 
unofficial practical solutions, and the commission of author-
. . t .d f •t d 13 ity to private groups o provi e or communi y nee s. 
At a time when men turned their prime energies away 
from public policy to private affairs; at a time of high 
social mobility, when there were few depressed groups with-
out any prospect of bettering their condition, 14 the courts 
were available to provide legal tools and procedures to 
enforce valid agreements. More continuously in session than 
the legislatures, and with better trained and disciplined 
personnel, insulated from special interest pressures by 
tenure, (still the norm in some states, though waning), they 
created the framework for coherent economic planning, a role 
justified while private interest fulfilled essential public 
needs. 
A range of procedural changes affecting the function-
ing of the courts had swept away dead forms, facilitating 
practice, though some, as the changing role of the jury 
demonstrates, decreased the participation of the people in 
13After the Whiskey Rebellion and the house tax riots 
in Pennsylvania, the government was cautious about employing 
its fiscal power. See Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 
109-110, where he discussed the formation of associations to 
serve societal needs. 
14Ibid., II, 136-8, 141, 156-7, 243-5. 
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the judicial process. 15 Legal education, with its prolifer-
ation of schools, court records and periodicals enabled the 
bench to achieve high standards of intellectual eminence, 
and to secure a favourable public image. Commentaries and 
doctrinal writings by teachers such as Kent and Story gave 
to the courts, at a critical period, authoritative state-
ments on the common law, and provided the basis of a taught 
tradition, fixing the reception of the common law for all 
jurisdictions, except one. 16 Judicial development of the 
common law as based on the natural law concept of a univer-
sal ideal form of law, permitted the courts to present the 
Constitution as a model political text~ judicial deference 
to the common law doctrine of supremacy of the law, and to 
the Constitution as the creation of the genius of the 
American people, enhanced its disciplinary power. 17 By 
means of judicial empiricism, judges gave content to 
abstract constitutional precepts, and procedural forms, and 
judged legislative activities thereby. 
In using law to regulate behavior and shape the envi-
ronment during a period of transition from pioneer, agricul-
tural to urban, industrialized America, the courts applied 
an individualist ideal of society, favourable to private 
individual and group liberty, with rare exceptions. This, 
15 Haar, The Golden Age of American Law, 200. 
16Pound, The Formative Era of American Law, 144, 151. 
That one was Louisiana. 
17 Ibid., 105, 108. 
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coinciding with the strain of Jacksonian idealism which had 
emphasized the social desirability of free individual deci-
sion and self-assertion, gave vitality to the use of law to 
promote private entrepreneurial activities. After the Civil 
War a major shift in economic and political power at the 
~pense of the farmer, the worker and the consumer would 
', 
make a mockery of democratic authority and aspirations. The 
work ethic, upon which the nation had been reared, which 
sanctified individual economic achievement, would be prosti-
tuted by those who were able to exploit the avenues of 
wealth afforded by this fluid, competitive society. 
It is in the formative era, as these cases demonstrate, 
that judges, perceiving themselves to be the ideological 
heirs of the founding fathers, "imposed their own views of 
proper economic and social policy upon the nation." 18 In 
the process, though they provided the mechanism whereby 
minorities might overturn the political judgments of the 
majority, as Tocqueville's majoritarian theory had suggested, 
they failed to protect manifestations of individualism dis-
sociated from traditional beliefs about correct conduct, no 
matter that these were sheltered by the Bills of Rights. 
Behavior deemed reprehensible, deviant or blasphemous 
received no legal sanction from conservative courts com-
mitted to social order, but not to civil liberties. This, 
Tocqueville had not foreseen. 
18 Nelson, "Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review," 
1185. 
The Frenchman's distinctive contribution to the phi-
losophy of democracy, it must be remembered, was intended 
for a European audience. If his majoritarian thesis, with 
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its dark forebodings that challenged the workability of the 
elective principle, appears to be a simplistic formula, 
which did not adequately explain the contradictory pressures 
that operated in American society at any given moment, its 
conclusions addressed the profound issues which deeply trou-
bled his countrymen as they weighed the prospects of further 
revolutionary changes. 
Neither his emphasis on the power of the majority, nor 
the indispensability of judicial authority as a neutralizing 
agent, were sustained by another nineteenth century politi-
cal analyst. The Jacksonian, Frederick Grimke, writing in 
the mid-1840's, stressed that public opinion, broadly based, 
offered a guarantee of stability through the balance of com-
peting forces in government and society, especially politi-
cal parties: 19 universal manhood suffrage diffused political 
authority. He believed that the judicial department had a 
"disproportionate share of importance," 20 and, his years on 
the Ohio Supreme Court having convinced him of the fallibil-
ity of the judicial character, he feared the elevation of 
judges above community surveillance, with the consequent 
encouragement of a dangerous gap between judicial doctrines 
19Frederick Grimke, The Nature and Tendency of Free 
Institutions, ed. John w. Ward (Cambridge, 1958). 
20Ibid., p. 438. 
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and evolving social needs. If they were to be accountable 
to the public, judges should be elected to office for only 
such a sufficient number of years that they might demon-
strate their competence without losing their dependence upon 
h . 21 t e community. He saw the institution of the jury as a 
"wide and salutary influence upon the administration of jus-
tice," a competent and equitable arm of law proceedings. 22 
The return to Tocqueville's hypotheses, however, by an 
ultra-conservative political scientist, occurred with the 
publication of Francis Lieber's On Civil Liberty and Self-
Government. Though he placed far greater emphasis on the 
protection of civil rights, he denounced universal manhood 
suffrage as leading to "serious misrule," 23 because the vet-
ing privilege was not granted upon the basis of property: 
"We seek for a criterion which will enable us to distinguish 
those who have a fair stake in the welfare of the state from 
those who have not. 1124 He believed that the judicial power 
ought to be independent, and conservative, for judges were 
"the brakes which prevent the vehicle from descending too 
fast on an inclined plane. 1125 In 1859, the elected judici-
ary was, in his opinion, "universally and unqualifiedly a 
serious failure"; 26 the confidence of the people in the 
ed. 
21 Ibid., 449-62. 
23F . . b rancis Lie er, 
Theodore D. Woolsey 
24Ibid., 173. 
26Ibid., 233-4. 
22Ibid., 463-4. 
On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 
(New York, 1972), 262. 
25Ibid., 226. 
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judicial system had decreased, with a consequent decline in 
esteem for the jury system. Yet the institution had its 
positive aspects, for it "enables plain, common and practi-
cal sense properly to administer itself with keen profes-
sional and scientific distinction," providing a school of 
f . . h" 27 ree citizens ip. 
The principle that political power should be exercised 
subject to fundamental limitations embodied in a written con-
stitution is an American tradition which reaches as far back 
as the Mayflower Compact. Constitutional guarantees give 
notice that ideals of justice and liberty lie within a pro-
tective shelter. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated, 
the courts could deliberately dispossess perceived aberrant 
individuals of civil liberties deemed cumbrous and untimely. 
All of these cases throw into bold relief the magnitude of 
the judicial policy-making power, a perplexing question 
which speaks to the legitimacy of judicial review. Though, 
by tacit consent of the people, this power is accepted, it 
ought always to be remembered that Bills of Rights, albeit 
self-imposed, are not self-enforcing. "The true friends of 
the liberty and the greatness of man," wrote Tocqueville, 
"ought constantly to be on the alert to prevent the power of 
government from lightly sacrificing the private rights of 
individuals to the general execution of its designs." 28 
27 
. b 0 . ·1 "b d lf-G 233 ,, Lie er, n Civi Li erty an Se overnment, - ... 
28Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 327. 
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